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NORDIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE PROMOTED BY PEACE GROUPS' CAMPAIGN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 28 Apr 81 p 5

[Article by Harald Hamrin: "Petitions, March, for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Nordic Countries"]

[Text] The organizers of the movement for nuclear-weapon-free Nordic countries hope for several million names just from the Nordic countries by the end of the year when they start collecting signatures on 1 May. In this action, behind which stand all of the Swedish peace organizations, there will also be a large "peace march" from Copenhagen to Paris next summer.

At a press conference in the Riksdag building in Stockholm on Monday, Maria Bergom-Larsson, one of the organizers of the action, emphasized that this is the first time that all Swedish peace organizations are supporting a concrete demand. It is also the first time that the peace movements in the various Nordic countries have started a common campaign with the intention of influencing the political decision makers in their respective countries.

The petitions, which begin 1 May, are going to continue until 12 December, when the organizers hope to call on the governments in the Nordic capitals with a demand for new initiatives on the question of a nuclear-weapon-free Nordic zone.

"Our hope is that we will collect several million signatures," said Maria Bergom-Larsson. "We hope that it will be the greatest action of its kind ever in the Nordic countries."

The petition makes four demands to the government and the Riksdag in Sweden as well as in the other Nordic countries:

- that no nuclear weapons are to be stationed in the Nordic countries, and that in a crisis situation the Nordic countries are not to be utilized for nuclear war,
- that efforts be made to obtain guarantees from the nuclear powers in which these pledge not to use nuclear weapons against the Nordic countries,
- that an international organization be set up with the task of ensuring that the nuclear-free zone is respected, and
- that the setting up of the zone will be the start of a security policy in which disarmament and reduction of tensions are the foremost objectives.

At Monday's press conference Maria Bergom-Larsson more exactly explained the meaning of the four demands. In the first phase the nuclear-weapon-free status of Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland should be established by treaty through discussions and conversations with the nuclear powers. In a later phase there can be an attempt to establish additional agreements in which the presence and use of nuclear weapons in neighboring areas are regulated. For example, the Soviet nuclear-weapon-equipped Golf-class submarines in the Baltic, and NATO's so-called SOSUS system (underwater microphones for submarine warfare) off the Norwegian Atlantic coast were mentioned.

Criticism

In the Swedish campaign committee for nuclear-weapon-free Nordic countries, representatives of the following organizations are participating: People's Campaign Against Nuclear Power, Swedish Peace and Arbitration Association, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Christian Peace Movement, Swedish Peace Committee, Swedish Section of the Women's International Democratic Federation and Women's Struggle for Peace.

On the other hand, neither the parties of the Riksdag nor their respective youth and women's organizations have been invited to participate.

"We will try to avoid having a profile of party politics," explained Maria Bergom-Larsson.

At the press conference criticism was also directed at the Swedish mass media for not paying sufficient attention, according to the campaign committee, to the peace movement in Sweden and abroad.

"They write about the threat, but the activities of the peace movement and the different demonstrations are not considered newsworthy," said Maria Bergom-Larsson.

The background of the growing peace movement in Sweden, and most of all in Great Britain and Holland is, according to the campaign committee, two recent developments within the United States and NATO: partly the so-called Carter doctrine from the summer of 1980 concerning limited nuclear war, and partly the NATO decision of December 1979 concerning modernization of American nuclear weapons in Europe.

The framework of the campaign program also includes, as DAGENS NYHETER previously reported, among other things a peace march from Copenhagen to Paris beginning 22 June and ending 6-9 August, which is the anniversary of the atomic bomb attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

9287

CSO: 3109/174

INDUSTRY MINISTER FORMS WIND ENERGY COMMITTEE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 29 Apr 81 p 37

[Text] On the initiative of Minister of Industry Nils G. Asling, an informal working group was formed on Tuesday to continue cooperation on the development of Swedish windpower.

The group's task is, among other things, to develop a common line between power companies and industry, and to "keep the pot boiling" while waiting for the results of the two test installations now underway.

The leader of the group is Leif Brandels, the new head of the Committee for Research on Energy Production. There will also be representatives for Svenska Varv, KaMeWa AB, Sydkraft, Vattenfall and a delegation for energy research.

The two test installations are being built at Maglarp in Skane, outside of Trelleborg, and at Nasudden on southern Gotland. They will be in place in 1982, and then will be operated for test purposes until 1984-85, when an evaluation will be made.

The Skane installation is being delivered by Svenska Varv, with Sydkraft as the cooperating partner. KaMeWa will deliver the installation on Gotland, with Vattenfall as partner.

One of the problems which the new working group must discuss is how to bridge the gap between the start of operation of the test installations and the evaluation several years later.

It is partly a question of utilizing the skills now being developed by engineers and others, and partly that the firms do not want to lose time in building up an export market for windpower installations. Svenska Varv recently received a preliminary order for 20 windpower installations from Hawaii.

9287

CSO: 3109/175

BRIEFS

SOLAR ENERGY REPORT--The solar heating centers at Lambohov in Linkoping and in Studsvik have been hit by increased costs caused by technical and administrative problems. Therefore the planning of future solar heating installations should be done more carefully. The above comes from a report by the National Institute for Building Research. Three solar energy experts have gone through the experiences of the solar heating installations at Ingelstad near Vaxjo, Lambohov, and Studsvik. The experiences show that Studsvik and Ingelstad have managed with relatively few problems in operation. But all three installations have been hit by problems caused by the climate. The placing of the solar collectors on a large number of small house roofs in Lambohov has not been especially good for reliability and maintenance, reported the experts. The three solar heating centrals which were investigated received government support through the Institute for Building Research. Solar heat is stored in water which is later pumped out for heating houses. In Lambohov 55 row houses are heated, in Ingelstad 52 small houses and in Studsvik an office building of 500 square meters. Investigation of the three projects will continue. [Text. [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Apr 81 p 1] 9287

CSO: 3109/175

NEW MINERAL DEPOSITS PREPARED FOR EXPLOITATION

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 16 Apr 81 pp 67-69

[Article by Jean Roume: "The New Mineral Map of France"]

[Text] Anglade, Montredon, Rouez, Echassieres ... These new deposits confirm it: our territory has not been depleted by millenia of exploitation. At the international level it constitutes an average mining country, where numerous discoveries are still possible.

There was only one family left in the village of Salau, in a narrow valley of the department of Ariège; today 200 families live there, spending 15 million francs a year in salaries locally or in Saint-Girons. This rebirth is due to the geologist who discovered the first crystallization of tungsten ever seen in this part of the Pyrenees.

Every year, the Mining Company of Anglade (Paribas, Charter, BRGM [Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration], Billiton) which exploits the Salau deposit, markets a volume of concentrates containing 500 to 600 tons of tungsten: half of the French needs.

"Tungsten is one of those minerals with regard to which it would not be unreasonable to believe that within 7 or 8 years France could eliminate its dependence on foreign suppliers," estimated Jacques Bertraneu, director of the France-Europe department of the Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration. As a matter of fact, during the last 10 years prospectors and miners have been working relentlessly in France.

As far as tungsten is concerned, three other new mines could start producing in a rather short period of time. One of them is at Montredon (department of Tarn), of which the last trial at the experimental stage is in progress. This open air site, which permits modern exploitation techniques, is being exploited by Coframines (a subsidiary of the BRGM). It has a potential of 400 to 500 tons of WO_3 [tungsten trioxide]: a quarter of the French needs. The second one is located at Montbelleux (department of Ille-et-Vilaine). It is held by Sumex (a subsidiary of the Panamanian Hochschild group), which is currently testing a new mechanized exploitation technique at the pre-commercial experimental stage. Here tungsten is combined with tin. The third one is the one at La Faviere (department of Var), where a limited but high grade deposit was sold by the BRGM to a PMI [Small and Medium-Sized Businesses], which produces quarry materials, and which is equipping it at this very moment. And the era of discoveries has undoubtedly not come to an end.

LA FRANCE, NOUVEAU PAYS MINIER



Map 1. France, New Mining Country

Key:

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| 1. iron from Lorraine | 8. iron |
| 2. silver | 9. lithium |
| 3. aluminum | 10. lead |
| 4. arsenic | 11. tin |
| 5. gold | 12. uranium |
| 6. copper | 13. tungsten |
| 7. fluorine | 14. zinc |
| 15. deposit which is exploitable or in the process of being put into exploitation | |
| 16. main mines and activity | |

Jacques Bertrando sorted out the budding in the French mining trade results by distinguishing three major geographic areas of interest: the West (primarily Bretagne), the Massif central and the remainder of France.

-- Bretagne. Primarily characterized today by three substantial masses of polymetallic ore (lead-zinc-copper) "at the stages of certification and the first exploitation assessment projects."

The sites at Bodennec and La Porte-aux-Moines each contain 250,000 to 300,000 tons of metals in rich but hard to concentrate ores. They require the development of specific treatment methods. The BRGM, which is its inventor, believes that it will be able to render its verdict before the end of this year.

Further to the East, the site at Roues (department of Sarthe), which is held by an Elf-Aquitaine-BRGM association, turned out to be the "big surprise" of the last few years. It is a mass of 100 million tons of low grade copper-zinc sulphides, equal in size to the large Spanish and Portuguese deposits. Its primary interest lies not in the metals it holds, but in the sulphur: "There is as much sulphur here as at Lacq. It is an important national resource which will be developed in the medium or long term."

Finally, at this moment Coframines is in the process of developing Ty-Gardien (department of Finistere), which should start producing in the summer. The expectation at full operation is of 1,000 tons of antimony per year: 20 percent of the French needs. Furthermore, the BRGM is studying a dozen serious indications of the presence of antimony spread across the French regions.

-- The Massif central. First of all, the presence of uranium (2,518 tons of metal content produced in 1979), confirmed by recent discoveries, which compensates for the depletion of the first exploitations and promises developments in production. Aside from Cogema (a 100 percent subsidiary of the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission]), the other operators are the French Uranium Ore Company [CFMU] and the Industrial and Mining Uranium Company [SIMURA]--both controlled by Imetal--the Center Uranium Mines Company [SMUC]--divided into thirds among the AEC, Imetal and private interests--and the Central Company for Radioactive Ores and Metals [SCUMRA]--a subsidiary of Minatome.

Among the important regional projects, Mailhac-sur-Benaize (department of Haute-Vienne), being developed by the Mining Company of Dong-Trieu, has a potential of 500 tons of uranium content per year as of 1982.

Non-uranium related systematic research is a few years behind that of Bretagne, which explains the relative rarity of commercial results at the present time. However, their importance is worth noting. In addition to the tungsten deposit at Montredon (department of Tarn), mentioned above, one needs to note the neighboring zinc mine at Saint-Salvy (owned by Penarroya) -- 20,000 to 30,000 tons of metal per year, 10 percent of the national needs -- the first success resulting from the BRGM's application of modern geochemical methods of prospecting. A relatively high grade of co-occurring germanium makes Saint-Salvy one of the major European reserves of this strategic metal.

Another recent discovery: that at Echassieres (department of Allier), which contains a polymetallic ore, lithium-tin-tantalum. A decision to exploit should in principle be made yet this year, by the equal share partnership of Penarroya-BRGM,

which is the proprietor of this site. Here, tin is not very plentiful and will be a by-product of the exploitation of tantalum (very much in demand for the manufacturing of microprocessors), which will first start on a small scale; the lithium (the supply is of world dimensions) will be exploited next, when the miniaturization of batteries and accumulators will once again have balanced the current surplus on the international market.

Finally, one should mention -- but only in terms of reserves -- the substantial masses of fluorine (3 to 4 million tons) discovered in the Morvan by various prospectors: BRGM, PUK (Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlman Company), Rhone-Poulenc, Denain-Anzin, etcetera. The development of this area is not being considered at this time because, on the one hand, France already has a surplus and exports this substance and, on the other hand, the nature of the deposits requires stripmining, which runs the risk of producing environmental protection problems.

-- The remainder of France. The gold deposit (combined with arsenic and silver) at Alaigne (department of Aude) has been back in the news. As a matter of fact, this old mine in the process of depletion, purchased by Coframines in February 1980, is being re-equipped to attack a new rather important deep deposit. The modern industrial complex at Salsigne will produce 2 tons of gold per year plus arsenic, sulphuric acid and silver concentrates. Its exploitation will begin at approximately the same time as that at Bourneix (Coframines and Penarroja), near Saint-Yrieix (department of Haute-Vienne), where several small gold masses have been identified, representing a yearly production of 800 kilograms over a period of 10 years. Research is being done to increase this reserve.

Very Sophisticated Prospecting Methods

Among the still very promising exploitation sites, let us mention the uranium at Lodeve (department of Herault). The fluorine deposits at Bois-Feuillet (400,000 tons of reserves) has been purchased from the BRGM by Sogerem (PUK group); its development does not seem to be imminent. The same is true of the lead-zinc mass (200,000 tons of metal) at Carboire (department of Ariège), owned by a BRGM-Penarroja partnership. Other studies will be required to estimate the profitability of investments which might be made in it.

According to Jacques Bertraneu, this 1981 balance must be placed back in its true framework, which is the renewal of mining prospecting in the old countries, which was started around 1960 with very "sophisticated" new methods of detection (aerial prospecting, geochemistry), and which has been confirmed in the last 10 years as the political will of the authorities.

"All metallic indications on the surface have been identified," he commented, "in the old industrial countries as well as in Canada and in Australia. Everyone now is working beneath tens or hundreds of worn out sites, which act as a screen for the geology of the subsoil. To find deposits in the new countries is as difficult as it is in Europe, which has equalized the chances of success."

From that point of view, France, of which the soil was believed to have been depleted by millennia of exploitation, at the international level constitutes an average mining country where numerous discoveries are still possible. "We will have other Anglades and other Montredons, other Rouez and other Echassieres ..."

CGIL MEMBERSHIP FIGURES SAID TO INDICATE 'STABILITY'

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 2 Apr 81 pp 18-20

[Article by Eligio Diagioni]

[Text] Notwithstanding an overall increase in membership, the figures from some areas, particularly the steep decline in farm-worker recruits and renewals, have left their mark. This may prove salutary, however, as a spur to rouse organizers from complacency and the arrogance born of "routine." Trends in 1981.

The final figures on issuance of union cards, shown on the tables by region and by category, confirm the CGIL's enduring stability once again for 1980.

As a matter of fact, there is an overall 15,576 increase in membership over 1979 (up 0.3 percent), boosting the CGIL to a record level of almost 4.6 million members.

Active involvement of all CGIL structures made it possible to compensate in the closing months of 1980 for some losses among active workers, which October figures had warned would be substantial: as a result, the decline in these categories was stemmed at only 31,794 members, or 0.9 percent, and offset by an increase of 47,370 retired members. Bearing in mind that the average dropout rate for various reasons annually affects an average of some 200,000 people, that remarkable eleventh-hour rescue mission is certainly worth special mention.

Even so, some losses really do hurt. One such is the loss of 43,984 farm workers (down 7.3 percent), a contributing factor to which was the result of the Vital Statistics Office's purging all who had reached the retirement eligibility age from the lists; another is the 8,295 cards unclaimed (down 3.2 percent) in transport, for reasons including but not confined to organizational problems which the Transport Workers Union (FILT) is probing in depth; still another is the loss of 4,020 Commerce and Public Enterprise (FILCAMEL) workers (down 2.1 percent).

For the record, in a number of categories 1980 brought advances over 1979. Outstanding was the Bank Workers (FIDAC) advance, with a 2,291

(5.2 percent gain in membership, as was the insurance workers' tally showing a 1.8-percent gain. Even the education workers' union, despite the everyday difficulties of all kinds it must cope with, totted up a 3,743 increase (2.7 percent); the same goes for the civil service federation, which reported gains of 9,309 members (up 2.5 percent) and the performing arts union (up 2.5 percent).

The following organizations in industry also reported gains: metalworkers (FIOM) reported 9,450 members (up 1.6 percent); the carpenters and allied building trades (FILLEA) turned in 2,747 (up 0.5 percent); and the graphics trades enrolled 507 new members (up 0.6 percent).

The overall picture for employed workers, even allowing for the heavy losses among farm workers, is generally healthy. At the national level it shows adequate stability from region to region with the exception of the South, where the decline in farm worker membership, since they are most numerous, made severe inroads on overall membership. In Sicily, for instance, the total loss of 10,760 employed CGIL workers can be chalked up primarily to the Farm Workers' Union (FEDERBRACCIANTE) which dropped from 110,060 to 101,903 (a loss of 14,159 members); in Apulia, as against an overall loss of 4,724 active members, they lost 6,705 farm workers (down from 119,211 to 112,503); in Campania, the 7,045-member loss among farm workers is higher than the combined total of 5,038 active workers -- all of which would indicate that in the other areas of labor the situation is either stable or improving.

So we see that 1980 was not altogether a bad year: generally speaking, we held the line. It was, though, a year for sober reflection and for renewed attention from all our agencies to the serious problems of recruiting which, in the fat years of the Seventies, had developed the familiar barnacles of bureaucratic routine. The barnacles were not, in all frankness, confined to the bureaucracy: in some cases the "routine" attitude was slipshod and arrogant, rooted in a victory won "once and for all," in a lifetime sinecure, and in a steady and comforting flow of money into the union's coffers.

The plummeting fall of "active" membership over the past few years was a rude reminder of the real world. Our startled attention must needs find new channels for making sure of our strength as we again make recruitment a top priority -- particularly among the young -- and make annual card renewal something more than a boring annual exercise, and turning it rather into a vital part of the political assessment of our lines and our proposals, working together to that end with workers from every sector of the economy and every corner of our land.

The card campaign now under way for 1981 has already switched over onto this track and in fact, at both category and geographical levels, there have been many debates, drives, and analyses designed to make this a different kind of campaign, one more relevant to the CGIL's needs today.

CIL Cards Issued for 1980 (by regions)

REGIONE	(1) TABELLE LAVORATORI ATTIVI		(2) TABELLE PENSIONATI		(3) TOTALE		(4) DIFFERENZE	
	1979	1980	1979	1980	1979	1980	1979	1980
PIEMONTE	853,448	250,340	-	3,108	42,383	47,715	+ 4,132	248,275
VAL D'AOSTA	2,920	4,408	+	488	925	1,160	+ 223	4,443
LIGURIA	131,946	130,201	-	1,765	38,804	40,720	+ 1,915	170,790
LOMBARDIA	672,900	673,607	-	2,293	141,795	146,320	+ 4,525	817,827
TRENTINO A.S.	38,064	37,850	-	214	8,000	8,200	+ 200	46,050
PIEMONTE V.G.	64,863	65,127	+	315	33,341	33,810	+ 469	88,977
VENETO	237,374	234,943	-	2,431	70,105	73,600	+ 3,495	287,563
EMILIA	687,195	685,084	-	2,111	281,173	288,778	+ 7,605	773,863
TOSCANA	340,225	340,272	-	53	111,638	114,760	+ 3,122	455,052
MARCHE	70,473	71,267	+	794	69,045	55,200	- 5,395	128,137
UMBRIA	54,095	54,283	+	186	23,846	23,200	- 646	75,061
LAZIO	267,887	268,573	+	686	23,450	23,442	- 8	300,015
CAMPANIA	225,915	220,677	-	5,238	37,614	37,018	- 596	257,865
PUGLIA	6,980	8,200	+	1,220	4,755	4,700	- 55	12,000
ABRUZZO	45,755	47,227	+	1,472	23,753	23,400	- 353	68,727
POCCHIA	290,184	295,664	-	4,776	43,000	44,000	+ 1,000	349,084
MARITIMATA	31,139	30,329	-	810	10,113	11,000	+ 887	41,899
CALABRIA	103,100	100,906	-	1,294	17,300	18,410	+ 1,110	119,216
SICILIA	225,243	214,578	-	10,764	65,780	80,500	+ 14,720	299,798
SARDEGNA	74,684	75,863	-	2,223	22,000	23,000	+ 1,000	100,684
TOTALE	3,127,331	3,405,537	- 28,794	1,054,143	1,103,513	47,370	- 4,582,474	4,399,050
							+ 25,270	+ 0,33

- Key:
1. Active workers cards
 2. Pensioners' cards
 3. Totals
 4. Differences:
 5. Real Percentage

CGIL Cards Issued for 1980 (by categories)

CATEGORIA	1979	1980	DIFFERENZE v.a. %	
(1) INDUSTRIA				
(2) Alimentari (FILSIAT)	108.993	108.828	- 365	- 0,3
(3) Chimici e Affini (FILCRA)	243.828	243.893	+ 65	+ 0,03
(4) Edili, Legno e Affini (FILISA)	409.300	471.047	+ 61.747	+ 15,1
(5) Metallomeccanici (FIHM)	187.800	187.250	- 550	- 0,3
(6) Poligrafici e Cartai (FILPC)	78.923	79.430	+ 507	+ 0,6
(7) Tessili e Abbigliamento (FILTEA)	289.852	289.198	- 654	- 0,2
(8) COMMERCIO E PUBBLICI SERVIZI				
(9) Commercio Pubb. Servizi (FILCAMS)	187.883	183.883	- 4.000	- 2,1
(10) Giornalai (SINAGI)	10.780	10.373	- 407	- 3,8
(11) AGRICOLTURA				
(12) Federbraccianti	197.177	183.193	- 13.984	- 7,1
(13) TRASPORTI				
(14) FILT	258.243	249.950	- 8.293	- 3,2
(15) SERVIZI PUBBLICI				
(16) Energia (FNLE)	44.719	44.470	- 249	- 0,5
(17) Postelegrafonici (FIP)	23.926	23.829	- 97	- 0,4
(18) Telefonici (FIDAT)	22.979	22.749	- 230	- 1,0
(19) FUNZIONI PUBBLICHE				
20) Federazione della Funzione Pubblica	371.508	380.917	+ 9.409	+ 2,5
(21) SCUOLA E RICERCA				
(22) Scuola (SNS)	124.221	127.974	+ 3.753	+ 3,0
(23) Istituti di ricerca	4.613	4.633	+ 20	+ 0,4
(24) CREDITO E ASSICURAZIONI				
(25) Assicuratori (FILDA)	13.951	14.211	+ 260	+ 1,8
(26) Banca d'Italia (USPIS)	5.120	4.522	- 598	- 11,7
(27) Bancari (FIDAC)	43.378	45.667	+ 2.289	+ 5,3
(28) ALTRI SETTORI				
(29) Arti Visive (FNLA)	320	360	+ 40	+ 12,5
(30) Spettacolo (FILS)	15.477	15.985	+ 508	+ 3,3
(31) Attrazioni Viaggianti (SNV)	602	598	- 4	- 0,7
(32) Varie	13.748	12.221	- 1.527	- 11,1
(33) PENSIONATI	1.058.143	1.102.513	+ 44.370	+ 4,2
(34) TOTALE	4.583.474	4.598.050	+ 14.576	+ 0,3

Source: CGIL Organization Office

[Key on following page]

[Key for table on previous page]

Key:

1. Industry
2. Food workers (FILZLAT)
3. Chemical and Allied Industry Workers (FILCEA)
4. Building, Wood and allied workers (FILLEA)
5. Metalworkers (FIOM)
6. Printing and Paper Workers (FILPC)
7. Textile and Garment Workers (FILTEA)
8. Trade and Public Enterprises
9. Trade and Public Enterprises (FILCAMS)
10. News Vendors (SINAGI)
11. Agriculture
12. Farm Workers (FEDERBRACCIANTI)
13. Transport
14. Transport Workers (FILT)
15. Public Utilities
16. Energy (FNLE)
17. Post and Telegraph Workers (FIP)
18. Telephone Workers (FIDAT)
19. Civil Service
20. Civil Service Workers (FFP)
21. Schools and Research
22. School Workers (SNS)
23. Research Institute Workers
24. Credit and Insurance
25. Insurance Workers (FILDA)
26. Bank of Italy Workers (USPIE)
27. Banking Workers (FIDAC)
28. Other Sectors
29. Visual Arts (FNLAV)
30. Entertainment (FILS)
31. Traveling Attractions (SNAV)
32. Miscellaneous
33. Retirees Pensions
34. Total

It is still too soon to draw any conclusions as to how the 1981 card renewal campaign will turn out, but from the data we have from the February lists, we can already gather some interesting signals. Comparing the overall total of card-carriers as of that date (end of February 1981 with end of February 1980) we have an increase of 273,382 cardholders (up 8.4 percent), and an increase among active workers (as of those same dates) of 56,832 (up 2.28 percent).

All told, as of 28 February 1981, the CGIL reached a membership of 3,522,101, or 76.5 percent of the closing figure for 1980; among the actives the figure was 2,540,151, or 72.6 percent of actives as of the end of 1980.

Are these actually signs that the tide is turning? We shall have to see in the next few months, which will bring us into congress time: by then the political commitment to the debate with the workers on the issues the CGIL will set before its 10th congress will perforce have woven itself deeply into the effort to increase consensus and support from young working men and women for our Federation.

6182

CSO: 3104/235

SA MACHADO ON CDS CONGRESS, ORIENTATION, STRATEGY, OBJECTIVES

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 3 Apr 81 pp 15-16

[Interview with new Social Democratic Center Party Deputy Chairman Vitor Sa Machado by Jose Nunes Pereira]

[Text] At the end of the recent congress, Prof Freitas do Amaral regarded the election of Dr Vitor Sa Machado to the post of deputy chairman of the party as one of the "prominent points" in stressing the centrism of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party]. In fact, the administrator of the G. Gulbenkian Foundation admits the following: "Because of what I always have been--and men also know their past--because of what I am and primarily because of what I should like to be, yes, I can calmly say that I am a man of the center-left."

In the interview that he granted to DN [DIARIO DE NOTICIAS], immediately after conclusion of the work and before going abroad, in spite of the shortness of time, Dr Sa Machado evaluated the results of the congress, spoke of restating his party's positions and of giving it a new start, pointed out the urgent need for strengthening the Democratic Alliance. He also stated the reasons that led him to suspend the duties of deputy chairman of CDS while he was serving as administrator of the Gulbenkian Foundation.

[Question] Dr Sa Machado, you have just been elected, by will of the delegates, deputy chairman of CDS. In your opinion, what are most outstanding aspects of the congress that has just concluded?

[Answer] I think that the feature that should be stressed most lies in the calm way in which the congress was held. Debates took place and elections were held in an atmosphere of great serenity, which did not exclude, however, either vigor or variety of opinions. And naturally enthusiasm, which was the constant feature of the congress and which expressed the obvious interest of the congress delegates in the problems to be treated and, in a general way, in the destiny of their party. All this shows that the CDS has achieved full maturity and that it is ready for a new stage of restarting and growth.

[Question] Prof Freitas do Amaral stated, a short time ago, that the election of Dr Sa Machado to his present post was one of the "prominent points" in stressing the

party's centrism. How do you interpret his statement? Is it, in fact, regarded as a factor capable of correcting any possible "rightist" shift of CDS?

[Answer] When I pointed out that the congress was characterized primarily by serenity, which definitely demonstrated the party's maturity, I also meant that CDS has reached a point in its existence in which it has ceased being subject to excessive circumstantial pressures. Circumstantial or situational pressures that obliged the party, in the recent past, to take specific tactical stands and, if I may say so, to navigate by sight.

The matter of right or left has little to do with this. I think that, in 1974-1975, the CDS was the possible right and perhaps also the necessary right, because it actually was a question there of forcing the revolution to open up, to oblige it become more pluralistic and more democratic. The party shaped up then in a certain way as a resistance party, isolated within a socialist revolution that barely allowed the socialist camp as the limit of its pluralism. At that time, we said, with courage that will not be denied us, that the revolution was not socialist, in the manner of the October Revolution, but rather democratic. By resisting, even when the successive elimination of parties of the right left us placed at the end of the political spectrum, and by not repudiating, but rather laying claim to our non-socialist nature, we performed, I believe, that enormous service to Portugal by forcing the regime to be more pluralistic; that is to say, democratic in the European manner. If the price that we had to pay was being regarded and classified on the right, patience. It was worth the trouble. We would do it again.

At present, fortunately, the regime is stabilized. The CDS is no longer faced with the need, as in 1974 and 1975, to challenge the power, in order to change it. Thus, we can concern ourselves calmly with attaining our less situational objectives.

Centrist Disposition

[Question] What ones, for example?

[Answer] I believe that the basic objective of the CDS now is to intensify and emphasize its real disposition; that is to say, the disposition of centrism. We are a centrist party. That was the initial objective and the primary determination of its founders. And although, at present, the CDS is not strictly what it was agreed upon to call a party of founders--actually it has become a great party--I believe that it was, among other reasons, an absolute necessity of political intelligence to return to its original orientation, because our adversaries do not want us to walk there, because the party can grow there, because there is where we shall especially strengthen the AD [Democratic Alliance].

The party is trying to grow, as is evident, but to grow, however, in the sphere of and with the AD. But it wants to grow owing to an increasingly broader and closer identification with what its rank-and-file really and potentially is. I means the Christian Democratic rank-and-file, the moderate rank-and-file. As a center party, the CDS finds its natural moderation, its more distinctive quality and characteristic. In order to satisfy that inclination, the CDS must make a restatement of positions that will clearly give preference to its moderate quality.

If, as we have seen, owing to pressure of situational circumstances, in one phase the party had to place itself more to the right, I believe that the time has come

to restate its positions effectively, inclining it toward the center, enhancing, if you wish, its center-left pole. I believe that the marked national sense, which led us, in the postrevolutionary past, to assume consistently a stand more to the right now advises us to look especially to our left.

[Question] Dr Sa Machado, do you regard yourself as a pole of that center-left move? Prof Freitas do Amaral, as party chairman, was the one who pointed out this aspect concretely.

[Answer] Understandably, I should not like to be myself the one to describe me in one way or another. I believe that men are much more what they do rather than what they say, but because they are also what they say, I should say, then, I have always regarded myself as a man of the center-left. Or, as De Gasperi says, as a man of the center who prefers to look to the left as the source of the values that I esteem most. Because of what I have always been--and men are also their past--because of what I am and primarily because of what I should like to be, yes, I can say, calmly, that I am a man of the center-left.

New Start to the Party

[Question] You said that basic decisions were made in the congress with a view to giving the party a fresh start. A fresh start, we presume, in terms of growth.

[Answer] Precisely.

[Question] Growth at the expense of whom?

[Answer] I should not like it to be thought that the growth of CDS is going to be carried out at the expense of anyone. That is a mistake. I believe that, in our country, a party like CDS, can and must grow by interesting primarily the large mass of voters who are not permanently tied to any party. Moreover, the AD shows that there is a fluctuating mass of voters determined less by ideological reasons than by programmatic motives. Coming back to the example of AD, it is evident that the emergence of the democratic coalition caused a greater voter support than the simple sum of the voters on which the PSD [Social Democratic Party], CDS and PPM [Popular Monarchist Party] counted at first. There is, let us say, an increased value that has to justify, it seems to me, what new element AD introduced, which thus can win a segment of voters who, perhaps, would have voted otherwise in previous elections. Thus, I believe that there is, in Portugal, a very large sector of voters not tied formally to any party and distinguished, precisely, by their desire for stability, social peace, government efficiency. All qualities that identify a moderate electorate and that is on the move at present. They are fluctuating voters who may just as well vote for one party or another and who will be determined depending precisely on those motivations.

This seems to me to be one of the conclusions to be drawn from the last election: there is actually a huge mass of voters acting out of concerns very pragmatic in nature. Primarily with regard to those voters who, because of their moderation, are potentially Christian Democratic, the CDS will try to make its promised new start and to grow without detriment to anyone and especially to its AD associates.

Strengthening of AD

[Question] Does that mean that you believe, consequently, in the stability and durability of the Democratic Alliance?

[Answer] Absolutely. The fact that the first point on the CDS strategy motion is precisely that it regards strengthening of AD--as it stated with unmistakable clarity--as the party's first priority. In fact, CDS wants to strengthen AD. I believe that AD carries an overall change project, corresponding, probably, to the desires and aspirations of the great majority of the Portuguese people. From this point of view, aside from the obligation stemming from the agreements signed in the context of AD, strengthening the Democratic Alliance is for CDS an urgent necessity, stemming from the election results, from the unmistakable mandate that it received there and also from the reading that we make of the nation's interest to which it is important to continue, strengthen, intensify, give preference to all the factors of cohesion of AD, among which the factor of frank, open support of its, of our, government must be stressed.

[Question] Lucas Pires, another deputy chairman of the party, seems still to have greater doubts. This is if we reflect on the statements made in his contribution to the strategy motion. How do you evaluate those statements?

[Answer] I do not believe that Dr Lucas Pires referred specifically to this point. We have, nevertheless, the experience of recent years. That experience tells us that there is, in Portugal, a temptation toward a certain amount of political experimenting. It is obvious that a coalition is not an easy undertaking. It gives rise to tensions inevitably. Dr Lucas Pires certainly attempted to call attention of the congress to those tensions, more possible and potential than strictly real.

[Question] Circumstantial pressures have disappeared. But grave problems are still observed that may, possibly, disturb Portugal's democratic activity. For example, how do you view the matter of revision of the constitution, bearing in mind the present political party situation?

[Answer] I believe that democratic activity is stabilized. But there still are some difficulties connected primarily with the internal situation of some large parties. Political parties are necessary interpreters of the will of the people. There is no democracy without parties, or stable democracy without sound parties. Logically, when these parties reveal problems and internal crises, some of that disturbance is inevitably reflected in democratic stability. Thus, I hope that the difficulties affecting some parties at present will be overcome rapidly.

When I say parties, I am certainly exaggerating. I am thinking, concretely, of the Socialist party. I sincerely want that party--so important and with such essential participation in the process of consolidation of democracy in Portugal--to be able to solve its internal problems without excessive costs, in order to lay the groundwork, in that way and on its part, so that revision of the constitution can be accomplished positively and with a consensus. I have stated the following many times: the Constitution must be an instrument for uniting the Portuguese people and not for separating them. In order to achieve that, moreover because of an obligation stemming from the fundamental law itself, the revision has to be made on the basis of a broad consensus between the democratic parties.

Exercise of the Office

[Question] It was specified at the start, Dr Sa Machado, that you will not exercise the office of CDS deputy chairman while you are serving as administrator of the Gulbenkian Foundation. By when do you anticipate taking over the party post?

[Answer] As long as I am serving as administrator of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, I shall defer serving as deputy chairman, in agreement, moreover, with my party. We think, and rightly, that there is a certain degree of incompatibility in the simultaneous exercise of both duties, naturally, because, by their nature, they both are very demanding in terms of application and time. Therefore, the duties as deputy chairman of CDS are held in abeyance at present.

[Question] How long?

[Answer] I cannot give you a concrete answer, specifying a date. I should say only as long as I am administrator of the Gulbenkian Foundation. In this connection, I should also like to point out that it is important for me to continue to practice my profession as administrator of the foundation. I am--and I say it in all propriety--a foundation man, where I have been working since 1960. I have made my whole career there. I regard the Gulbenkian Foundation as an extremely valuable project, with unquestionable importance to the nation. I have served it and, in some way, have also been of service to the country. Moreover, that is the point of view from which I take on my work in the institution to which I am bound by deep-seated ties, not only professional but also dedicational. Events, some happy, others not always happy, like the ones marking the lamentable revolutionary agitation that occurred there in 1975, have given it special firmness.

But, in the same way, I want--and it matters much to me to say also that my first availability is to my party.

10,042

CSO: 3101/79

FREEDOM OF PRESS ISSUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Feb 81 pp 3, 6

[Article by Silva Costa: "Freedom of the Press and Constitutional Revision"; revised text of the speech in the Colloquy on "Journalists, News and Constitutional Revision," sponsored by the Journalists Union and held in the Press House]

[Text] 1. Freedom of the press does not depend on the form of its constitutional expression. There are dozens of constitutions proclaiming it in countries that do not respect it. It is not less in Switzerland (with six words in the text of the Federal Constitution) than in Portugal (11 paragraphs in two fundamental articles). Because, however, the constitution must express and shape social realities simultaneously, freedom of the press merits in it the dignity of a summary of the basic freedoms. Taken in a broad sense and therefore integrating the right to information and to freedom of speech by means of radio and television, it is guarantor of the exercise of the fundamental rights in a democratic country. In that conception, it has no degrees: either it exists, or it does not exist.

It assumes--from universal history and from domestic experience--independence of the news media from the political or economic authorities. In spite of the high cost of the mass media, they have to be made workable, without submerging them in the game of financial interests. Especially in the case of news media belonging to the state and to other public collective persons, they must be protected from the innate tendency of the political authorities to become absolute and to confuse legitimacy with their will and the common good with their arbitrariness. Freedom of the press is incompatible with intervention by the political authorities in press activity (written and audiovisual) and in institutions responsible for watching over the citizens' right to true, independent, highly objective news.

The mass media are affected much more by the conditions of functioning than by ownership of producer goods. They are compatible a) with the existence of limitations on the right to establish and own audiovisual news media and resulting from their nature, provided equality of opportunity of all citizens is guaranteed, b) with the existence of news media belonging to private enterprises, cooperatives, agencies of regional and local administration and to the state, provided the news furnished by them is also independent of the political authorities and equally independent of state sources.

It seems evident that both the constitution and laws should make a differentiation between news media of a doctrinary nature, especially those belonging to political parties and religious faiths whose objective is the institutional interest of the respective owner, and general news media attempting to make it possible for citizens

to exercise the right to independent, true news, objective to the highest degree. For purposes of special assistance by the state, it will also be possible to give special treatment, among the general news media, to those that are owned by institutions of public interest and by nonprofit private companies aiming, therefore, at public written and electronic news service.

In the last 10 or 15 years, however, the idea has been making headway that protection of freedom of the press depends primarily on a definite protection of the intellectual function and of the economic function in each general news organ and on the establishment of a relationship of good faith between the news organ and the readers, or listeners, or viewers, by means of the adoption of unambiguous editorial statutes, a public commitment to respect and observe journalistic ethics and deontology, recognition of the journalist's responsibility as an expert on independent, true news, objective to the highest degree, and confirmation of the editorial responsibility of editorial staffs (as representatives of the intellectual function of the press). In some of these areas, there is already a social experience worthy of attention. Public news companies, Press Council, editorial councils, stability of managers and publishers are examples of new concepts and situations that the constitutional revision cannot fail to take into account, in order to restructure protection of the freedom of the written and audiovisual press. In spite of the prudent silence maintained with regard to these matters by almost every revision draft that has been published.

Intellectual Function in the News Media

2. Because the constitutional rules on protection of freedom of the press cannot have direct application--unfortunately, news is a complex process--prudence advises consideration of projecting it into ordinary law and measuring its effects. We shall try to see the main ones.

Responsibility for the intellectual function in each news organ lies jointly with the managing editor, the editor in chief and the other professionals who perform journalistic duties and who for these purposes are regarded as represented by the editorial council.

Also for that reason, in reserving exclusively to managing editors responsibility for the content of newspapers, the Press Law sacrificed journalistic practice to legal expediency, certainly without imagining the consequences that concentration of the decision-making power would come to have, especially in 1975, in the so-called "stabilized" press.

In order to safeguard freedom of the press, it will be necessary to adjust legal rules to the facts. In the large written news organs, the management is necessarily coresponsible for the content. The principle also applies to the news content of the audiovisual press, which includes at least the whole area of the news editors in chief and not merely news broadcasts. A redetermination of responsibilities and powers will easily lead to the assumption that any final decision is tied only to the managing editor, without excluding the usually joint responsibility of the managing editor and the editor in chief and of the editor in chief in the absence of the managing editor.

In addition, in confirming constitutionally the editorial council for its responsibility in the intellectual function of the press in the broad sense, it will indeed

be absolutely necessary to recognize in that council the right to hear all matters of importance to the general orientation of the news organ and the right to issue a binding opinion for the appointment of the managing editor and deputy or assistant managing editor, appointment of the editor in chief, hiring of journalists and particularly serious decisions like merger or suspension of a news organ.

The constitutional guarantee of the minimum requirements necessary for the stable, efficient performance of the duties of managing editor and editor in chief would, in turn, involve, under this assumption, the contracting of those respective executives for periods not less than 5 years (that is to say, longer than the term of a legislature). Compulsory dismissal from the post would be subject, in the case of editors in chief, to a favorable opinion by the Editorial Council, with appeal to the Press Council. In the case of the managing editor, subject to the favorable opinion of the Editorial Council and also to the favorable opinion of the Press Council, provided disrespect for the constitution and the law or deontological rules was invoked as a basis for the dismissal in the disciplinary hearing. If the hearing should also aim at dismissal from the company, there would be cause for a double decision by each council. When, for cancelation of the contract, a managing editor is charged with contumacious errors in journalistic administration with serious effects on economic management, the binding opinion of the Supervisory Council or the Constitutional Rules Council--a body whose establishment and powers are outlined below--would have to be added to the opinion of the Editorial Council.

Confirmation and Powers of the Press Council

3. The Press Council was confirmed constitutionally for reasons of competition that are obvious and perhaps also because its independence was not always well understood. Nevertheless, the council fully justifies the dignity refused in 1976. It was certainly the body that stood out most as guarantor of the freedom of the press and as defender of the intellectual function of the press. It only lacked the capability of creating for itself the image of a moral court with public projection and inherent effectiveness. It made some historic pronouncements and it was very punctilious in examining complaints and in the opinions that it issued on doctrinary productions of international organizations and on legislative initiatives by Portuguese organs of sovereignty. But, also owing to a lack of structures, with which it was provided only later, it remained aloof from essential issues. It did not exercise decisive supervision, which consisted of certification of compliance of the content of each news organ with the pertinent editorial statutes and of demanding public explanation by news organs not complying, in the news area, with the deontological commitment contained obligatorily in the editorial statutes. These insufficiencies must be corrected in the constitution. It is certainly time to confirm the council not only as guarantor of freedom of the press with regard to the political and economic authorities, but also as moral court for the intellectual function of all news media, including, therefore, radio and television, entirely comparable in this respect. It is also believed necessary to characterize the council--leaving the method to the technicians in the professional and business associations and in the specialized public services--as promotor of the citizens' right to independent, true news, objective to the highest degree, by means of public and periodic examination of violations of the commitment, almost renewed periodically between the news organ and its potential audience. This commitment is the editorial statutes. The Press Council should also be made responsible for safeguarding the basic rights of journalists (article 5 of the Journalists' Statutes) and especially the right to professional secrecy, to which constitutional dignity should be given also moreover.

In the exercise of its function as a court and in the system of powers that has been regarded as possible, the Press Council would be called upon to pronounce itself as follows in circumstances especially important to the independence of the intellectual function: a) as an appeal body, in case of a negative opinion by the editorial councils pertaining to the appointment of the managing editor and of the editor in chief of news media (press, radio and television); b) as a consultative body for issuing a binding opinion, in case of dismissal of a managing editor before the end of the contract term, if disregard of the constitution, of the law or of the deontological rules has been invoked in the hearing as grounds.

As would necessarily have to be, constitutional sanction of these powers entails revision of other legal rules concerning the composition of the Press Council, which would begin to incorporate representatives of the radio and television enterprises and of journalists and other workers in those mass media, and concerning the rules for its functioning, so that the issuance of opinions by the council on compliance with the editorial statutes might oblige each news medium to assume its responsibility.

Replacement of the News Councils

4. The news councils that emerged from the constituent situation have certainly been the objectively least effective bodies in protection of the freedom of the press. Strictly speaking, they functioned only as a reflection of more or less explicit parliamentary majorities. In other words, they were extensions of the political authority. Their abolishment can be a prophylactic act, provided independence of the news media belonging to public agencies from the political authorities is guaranteed by adequate means and ideological pluralism--or, as has already been proposed, "expression and comparison of the various political, ideological, religious and social tenets"--is ensured in them. If the political parties realized that it is to their advantage to retain those second-line deputies as specialized support bodies of the Assembly of the Republic or as pressure groups, it will be at most a problem coming under the state budget. From the point of view of independence and freedom of the press, there only seems to be an advantage in concentrating in professionalized bodies--the editorial councils--and in a court of ethics--the Press Council--the present powers of the news councils with regard to evaluation of compliance with constitutional, legal and deontological rules concerning news.

Nevertheless, because the constitutional and legal rules pertaining to audiovisual news media also cover programs not subject to supervision by news directorates and, because it is important to make intervention by public authorities in public news enterprises or their equivalents as difficult as possible, it is possible to conceive of a less parliamentarized body, although with party representation, that would supplement, at the level of each enterprise, the supervisory activity of the Press Council. For the sake of convenience, it is called here Supervisory Council (or Constitutional Rules Council), although it is understood that it should supplement the activity of an auditing court without ever replacing it. The Supervisory Council would include a representative from each party with a seat in parliament, a representative of the workers in the public news enterprise, a judge appointed by the Higher Judiciary Council and a president appointed by the president of the Republic. In audiovisual news enterprises, it could be responsible for supervision protection of ideological pluralism in the content of not specifically news programming. In every public news company it should follow up on the overall management and pronounce itself on it and issue a binding opinion in case of compulsory dismissal of the management board.

Public News Companies

5. Thus, we come to another essential point in safeguarding freedom of the press that provisions of the constitution must not fail to cover: appointment of the management boards, in turn responsible for appointing or dismissing managing editors, in turn responsible for appointing or dismissing editors in chief. How can the political authorities in office, regardless of what they may be, be prevented from intervening in the orientation of news enterprises belonging to the state or other public enterprises? How can sacrifice of responsibility, capability and efficiency to political party criteria be prevented?

Because no perfect, not even satisfactory, solution is in sight, the system under consideration is based on the following: 1) once the social cost of the news that the social collectivity decides to support through public news companies has been predetermined, the pertinent administrators could be chosen in accordance with criteria of financial and administrative management capability in each enterprise, because news management would be incumbent on managing editors and editors in chief whose appointment and dismissal would be subject to other bodies; 2) it is possible to exempt public news companies from the system common to the state business sector--which is what is happening already for the politicalization of those enterprises--and, therefore, form them into public news companies dividing the public ownership in a way to enhance management in terms identical with the situation in true stock companies; 3) the political authorities must be kept away from management of publicly owned news media by means of a barrier of independent decision-making centers.

Thus, the capital of public news enterprises would be held in equal parts by a digital number of other public enterprises oriented toward supervision in economic and financial management, each one of which would appoint a member of the Management Council. It might be conceded that the president of the Management Council should be appointed by the president of the Republic on nomination by the Cabinet or by qualified majority of the Assembly of the Republic, giving in to the present tendency to give the post excessive political value--a solution that has no special merit. Because the Management Council consists of those members and of others appointed by the workers, a significant change in its composition at the initiative of the political authorities would involve a series of chain maneuvers that would be feasible with difficulty. In order to strengthen the guarantees of independence, the Management Council would have, in principle, a term of office longer than a legislature--5 years in this formula--and its compulsory dismissal--when not resulting from a unanimous decision by the co-owning enterprises--would require a favorable opinion by the Supervisory Council (or Constitutional Rules Council).

This system would be applied, with proper adaptations, to news media belonging to regional and local administration agencies.

It is obvious that the opinions of the Press Council on a very serious or systematic violation of constitutional, ethical or statutory rules by the Management Council would oblige the enterprises holding capital jointly to replace the managers.

The plan that has been presented--and that is agreed to be feasible, because it is less complex than it seems at first sight--comes up here exclusively for information that it will be possible to free public news enterprises from the hands of the

public authorities, to stabilize administration and news management and to provide the citizens with independent, true and highly objective news, which is a real public service. We have already seen that there are no easy solutions. Abuse of power and incompetency have justified each other mutually under the protection of ownership and to the detriment of the social function of state news media or the equivalent.

Nonprofit Projects

6. The analysis that has been undertaken leads to the conclusion that negotiation of a constitutional restructuring of freedom of the press will probably involve revision of the Press Law, the Television Law, the Press Council Law, the law on news councils and a draft-law on radio. That is quite a job!

There certainly is an incentive for seeking new ways for consensus. So far, unanimity of jurists, politicians and journalists concerning regulations needed for protecting freedom of the press has been achieved in no country where it exists.

But journalists are very right in not cherishing illusions. They have known very well, ever since politics has been intervening, that public figures are interested in the press primarily because of the representation that it gives of their image and not because of the independence with which it serves the citizens. They would gain nothing, however, by turning their back on the problem, because dignification of journalism depends on the existence of a generally accepted deontological code and on putting the great constitutional principles in concrete form. And they have in favor of the positions of the profession the advantage of pioneering experience: cooperatives of journalists and other press workers, of which the LE MONDE cooperative is a model, are there to show that it is possible to bet on nonprofit news projects, to the benefit of the right to information and, in the final analysis, to the benefit of democracy.

10,042

CSO: 3101/81

TEXT OF SECRET GOVERNMENT REPORT ON ATTEMPTED COUP

Significance of Report

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Mar 81 pp 1, 6

[Article by Thierry Maliniak: "Instability in Spain"]

[Excerpts] The account of the attempted coup d'etat on 23 February given to the deputies behind closed doors by the minister of defense, but nonetheless published on Wednesday, 18 March, in the Spanish press, confirms the breadth of the military conspiracy. The minister stated that the government had known since the end of last year that a broad-scale coup d'etat was being planned. Major General Torres Rojas, former military governor of La Coruna, was officially charged with military rebellion on Tuesday. Two other generals, Milans del Bosch and Armada, have already been charged on the same count. Moreover, the economic crisis is growing more acute: the incapacity of the government to adopt a specific plan of action (see p 32) has been added to the inadequacies in the private sector.

Madrid--Minister of Defense Alberto Oliart gave a detailed account to the members of parliament behind closed doors on Tuesday, 17 March, concerning the attempted coup d'etat on 23 February. Shortly after the end of the session, from which the public and the press were categorically barred, the address delivered by Mr Oliart nonetheless began to leak out, through the intermediary of several deputies who took the pains to record it.

Mr Oliart's account revealed the extent to which preparations for the putsch were carefully planned, and the depth of the support available for it within the armed forces.

According to the minister, the attempted coup d'etat began on the afternoon of 23 February with the arrival of the military governor of La Coruna, General Torres Rojas, in Madrid. At about 1600 hours he went to the headquarters of the Brunete armored division, which he commanded as recently as 1979, and demanded to see its commanders in chief. When they had gathered, Commander Zancada took the floor to explain that he had talked the preceding evening in Valencia with General Milans del Bosch. The latter had warned him that very serious events would develop in Madrid the following day beginning at 1800 hours, that a state of emergency would be declared in Valencia, and that everything would proceed in accordance with the orders of the king and General Armada.

This announcement apparently did not provoke much resistance within the armored division, if one is to judge from the minister's account. The only objections pertained to the lateness of the hour which would prevent taking all the steps required.

The answer to this was that all the division units had already been alerted previously, which provides further proof of the extent of the complicity working in favor of the authors of the putsch, if such proof is needed.

At that moment, Colonel San Martin, chief of the general staff of the division, who was working with the plotters, proposed that Operation Diane, calling for military seizure of the radio and television stations and a number of strategic points in the capital, be activated. A scant three minutes after the seizure of the congress by Lieutenant Colonel Tetero, Operation Diane was launched.

The head of the armored division, General Juste, on emergency recall from Zaragoza, warned the captain general of the Madrid military region, Lieutenant General Quintana. Thanks to their intervention it was possible to halt the movements of the armored division troops.

In Valencia, General Milans del Bosch asserted that he was acting on orders from the king, which, he explained, had been transmitted to him by General Armada, consistent with constitutional provisions. Apparently only General Leon Pizarro, among the general staff officers in Valencia was aware of the true intentions of his commander.

Shortly before the putsch was launched, General Milans del Bosch gathered his subordinates together and explained to them that the operation was designed to establish a government which would be headed by General Armada and in which all political parties would participate. He announced the seizure of the congress in Madrid even before it occurred. At about 2000 hours, the chief military commanders in Valencia pledged their loyalty to General Milans del Bosch. The chief of the general staff of the land army, General Gabeiras, telephoned Milans del Bosch at that time and informed him that he would be replaced. General Milans del Bosch responded that henceforth he would take orders only from General Armada. It was then that he deployed the tanks in the heart of the city.

"To Save the King"

Shortly after midnight an important telephone conversation took place between Lieutenant Colonel Tejero and General Milans del Bosch. The former informed the latter that General Armada would propose to the deputies that a government headed by himself be formed. Tejero was opposed to this solution, but his interlocutor urged him to go along with it.

The king in turn telephoned the captain general of the Valencia region and ordered him to stabilize the situation in the town. Toward 0230 hours, he sent him a telex which was particularly dramatic in tone: "Today more than ever," the sovereign stated, "I am determined to respect the oath made to the flag, thinking only of Spain. I swear that I will never abdicate nor abandon the country. He who rebels is contributing to the provocation of civil war and must bear that responsibility." Shortly thereafter, General Milans del Bosch canceled the emergency measures.

The account given by the minister of defense established that several Civil Guard officers began at about 1600 hours to mobilize several dozen Civil Guards, who were told that they would be dispatched to the parliament "to save the king." When they arrived, they were ordered by the director of the Civil Guard, General Aramburu, to withdraw. But they did not obey these orders.

From the beginning, Lieutenant Colonel Tejero had made it known that he was not prepared to deal with anyone but General Armada. Toward 0130 hours, General Armada stated in the presence of witnesses: "The king is wrong. He has compromised the crown by cutting himself off from the armed forces. This is a military matter which must be resolved by the military." He had earlier proposed heading an emergency government in order to resolve the crisis, but without success. To justify his undertaking, he had passed on false information to his superior, General Cabeiras, stating that four military regions rebelled in support of General Milans del Bosch. When his complicity with the rebels became evident, he was assigned a permanent national police escort.

As of that moment, it was the director of state security, Mr Francisco Laina, who personally headed the negotiations, maintaining direct contact with the king. With the Council of General Staff Commanders, also faithful to the crown since the beginning, Mr Laina played a leading role in the resumption of control of the situation by the constitutional forces.

Publication of Mr Oliart's address, which was the lead story in the Spanish press that Wednesday, 18 March, despite pressure from the minister of defense to prevent its publication, was to have the effect of a bombshell. By clearly explaining the role of the main authors of the putsch, and revealing collusion heretofore unknown, it forced the military courts to pursue their investigation to the end. Otherwise, those who asserted that the attempted coup d'etat had profound ramifications and that one could not be content to deal with the visible part of the iceberg, who now had a weighty supplementary argument to support their claim, would have been completely discredited in the eyes of the public.

It remains to be seen how these revelations will be viewed in the barracks. It is feared in Madrid that the army may react very badly to the public revelation of the divisions within it during the events of 23 March. The responsibilities are so heavy and so widely shared that the shock must inevitably be particularly harsh.

Defense Minister's Address

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 18 Mar 81 pp 13-16, 19 Mar 81 pp 17-18

[Text of 17 March address by Minister of Defense Alberto Oliart to closed-door session of Congress of Deputies on 23 February attempted coup]

[18 Mar 81, pp 13-16]

[Text] The report read by Minister of Defense Alberto Oliart to the Congress of Deputies about the events which culminated in the attempted coup d'etat on 23 February lasted something over one hour. By resolution of the Council of Chamber spokesmen, approved hours earlier, with the socialist and communist groups voting

against it, the plenary session was held behind closed doors and journalists were not allowed access to the main congress building. LE PAIS is carrying on these pages the contents of the minister's report, to which it obtained access thanks to recordings and transcripts.

I am here before you to give you the government account of the events which occurred on 23 and 24 February. I am motivated by the firm intention of telling you everything we know to date, but I must comment that I have a double limitation on my explanation. First of all, a series of investigations of events, individuals and behavior which is either just beginning or has not yet been completed is in progress. These investigations are being carried out by the competent military authorities and by the Ministry of Interior. The results, which we do not yet have and which are not included in my explanation, will be made available to the special military judge.

On the other hand, the activities of the military judge of the first military region, General Diaz de Aguilar, designed to establish the foundations for the trial documents already ordered or to establish whether other responsibility exists, come under the legal secrecy of summary proceedings, in which only the judge, and if necessary the prosecutor, have access to the materials during the investigation stage. The private parties involved and their defense attorneys also have access.

Although hindered by these two limitations, the government deems it necessary not to delay this communication further, although the investigations in progress and the pursuit of the indictments may be determined in the future by the revelation of facts and responsibilities other than those which have become clear thus far through the processes already known to all of you.

The facts which I will proceed to relate are those included in the reports drafted by the military commanders of the various provinces, by the Civil Guard headquarters and the government of the nation. None of them are summary. Before beginning my explanation, I will tell you that from what we have learned to date, we can say that there was a major advance in the date of the execution of the 23 February military coup. Its main authors placed security above efficiency and for that security sought the participation of very few individuals as principal authors, up to the very day of the coup. This would explain why the government intelligence services did not find out about it, although for some time certain indications of a conspiracy had been under investigation.

They began with the assumption that a chain reaction would occur in the armed forces and in the state security forces as well. They did not count on the energetic and categorical attitude of the king, which canceled out the effect caused initially by the regrettable use of his majesty's name, and led to a reaction of discipline and loyalty on the part of almost all the armed forces commands. The group behind the coup sought, using the name of the king, acting boldly and utilizing surprise, to sweep other higher and intermediary commands into decisions and attitudes which once adopted would be irrevocable. I want to repeat that there existed and had earlier been detected obvious indications that an atmosphere propitious to the development of a movement which might lead to a coup d'etat was being created. But I want to tell you that there was no suspicion that a coup was being planned for the moment and in the way in which we suffered from it. Also, in my view, it is clear that the presence of the entire cabinet and the vast majority of the deputies in this congress for the

investiture vote and the fact that the cabinet was headed by a president who had already resigned while his successor had not yet been installed were two other circumstances which exerted a decisive influence on the decision of the authors of the coup.

As to what I have said about the possible reasons that the intelligence services of the ministries of defense and interior and the Civil Guard failed to have knowledge of the preparations for the 23 February coup d'etat, I would not wish this to be taken as an attempt to exonerate them. It is the definite intention of this government to continue the reorganization of these services and to perfect them in greater depth to prevent the possibility that such events could recur in the future. The events which I am going to set forth on the basis of a schedule plan are focused on the decisions, movements and actions which occurred within four different scenarios: the First Brunete Armored Division in Madrid, a part of the Third Military Region garrison, the seizure of the Congress of Deputies, and the bodies which were functioning during those hours up to the development of the dramatic episodes experienced by this chamber: the functioning cabinet, the Council of General Staff Commanders and land army general staff commanders. All of this remains intertwined with the name of General Armada, his own conversations and attitudes and those of other individuals involved in the attempted coup d'etat.

First Brunete Armored Division

Major General Torres Rojas, military governor of La Coruna and former commander of the armored division, flew to Madrid in the early hours of 23 February, duly authorized by the military commander of the eighth region, to deal with certain private matters.

At 1600 hours on that day, approximately, said General Torres Rojas appeared at the headquarters of the armored division located in El Pardo, and once there asked that the division and general staff commanders be gathered together, without giving any hint of what his real intention might be, stating that he only wished to greet them in his capacity as former division commander. This meeting was arranged in accordance with the desires of General Torres Rojas, and during the next hour, between 1615 and 1700 hours, all of the commanders and officers, the commanders of 12 armored brigades and 11 mechanized brigades, the artillery division and regiment commanders and the commanders of the light antiaircraft group in the division troop nucleus gathered together.

The division commander, General Juste Fernandez, had departed for Zaragoza, accompanied by the chief of his general staff, Colonel San Martin Lopez, at 1000 hours on the same day, 23 February. There they were to pay an inspection visit to the San Gregorio maneuvers area, where the three combat vehicle battalions of the division and one of its self-propelling artillery groups had been sent to carry out Operation Beta, in accordance with the planned training schedule. En route to the capital of Aragon, General Juste stopped at the quarters of the land army paratroop brigade, intending to attend the ceremonies being held to commemorate the 27th anniversary of the establishment of the first parachute unit.

Toward midday, an hour after his arrival at Alcala, General Juste and his party left the barracks of the BRIPAC, the parachute brigade, and continued toward Zaragoza, stopping to lunch at the Santa Maria de la Huerta national tavern. On his arrival, on reaching Zaragoza, Colonel San Martin called the division to say that they had

arrived, and he then learned that the general was to return immediately to the general headquarters of the division in El Pardo, because something serious had occurred, although no further details were given.

General Juste and his party in fact started back to return at 1430 hours, reaching the general headquarters in El Pardo at approximately 1700 hours. On arrival, they found gathered there all the division chiefs and commanders mentioned above, and General Torres Rojas. This was the scenario when Colonel San Martin, head of the division general staff, announced that there was a very important matter to deal with and asked permission to have Commander Pardo Zancada, head of the second general staff section for that division, explain.

Commander Pardo Zancada gave the following explanation. He said that on the preceding day, Sunday, 22 February, he had talked in Valencia with the commander of the Third Military Region, General Milans del Bosch, who had said that on Monday, 23 February, an event of a very serious nature would occur in Madrid, leaving no alternative but to take steps to guarantee order and security in the first region, since the third region was already prepared. He said that he would declare a state of emergency in the territory under his jurisdiction, and that the armored division should be prepared in case this was necessary. Commander Pardo Zancada added that the signal to act would be a notable event which would be reported by the RTVE [Directorate General of Radio Broadcasting and Television] and would occur beginning at 1800 hours. Finally, and to safeguard the action, he stated repeatedly that this would all develop with the agreement and under the orders of the king. Pardo guaranteed these statements, giving assurance that General Armada would be at the Zarzuela Palace as of 1800 hours.

The reactions from then on were as follows: General Torres Rojas confirmed all that Commander Pardo had said, and he stated that this was not a question of a movement. The division commanders gathered together noted that it was already very late and that at 1730 hours, because of marching orders and troop review it was not possible to do what they had been asked. The division general staff responded that all of the units had previously been alerted.

Those present asked for further details, and they were told that nothing further could be revealed, and that they should all be reassured that everything had been arranged for and announced.

General Juste, the division commander, set forth the same objections as his subordinates, and insisted on the need to inform the General of the First Military Region, General Quintana Lacaci. He was told, and all these responses came from the same general staff group, that General Milans del Bosch was taking care of this.

Given this anomalous situation and the demands of General Torres Rojas, General Juste concluded that it was necessary to gain time. Colonel San Martin proposed that the general staff proceed to draft the orders necessary to launch Operation Diana. This required, in brief, making an announcement on television, from radio broadcasting stations, and at certain points in Madrid. General Juste agreed. He then gave the pertinent orders, and as of 1800 hours, the division commanders left the general headquarters, confirming these orders on arrival at their own units and ordering that they be implemented.

At 1825 hours, three minutes after the seizure of the congress, the password "lunes" [Monday], previously agreed upon for the launching of Operation Diana, was received by the units, with the correction for the launching of the operation: Diana corrected. General Juste, on learning of the attack on the congress, decided to establish that General Armada was present at the Zarzuela Palace. At 1845 hours he was able to reach General Sabino Fernandez Campos, who explained to him that Armada was in the waiting room.

This was the first alarm signal pointing to the possible involvement of General Armada in the rebellion. General Juste then called Captain General Lacaci of the First Military Region, and told him of the situation and the steps which had been taken. Quintana Lacaci ordered him to keep all units in their barracks. This order was given personally by General Juste and by the captain general to each and every one of the division commanders. I can tell you that as of that moment, the intervention of the Brunete armored division had been frustrated. Before the captain general's order to keep all of the units in their barracks, which order was carried out without the slightest hesitation, had been received, some of the detachments of the 14th Villaviciosa Cavalry Regiment had already departed for the RTVE, and other units of the division's mixed engineers regiment had also departed for the same destination.

The activities of the captain general of the First Military Region, who maintained constant contact with the general staff commanders and with General Juste, also began during the very first moments of the development of the coup in Madrid.

Warned by his aides of the events in the congress, General Quintana immediately made contact with the chief of the army general staff, who ordered him among other things to locate General Juste, and at 1845 hours, as has already been said, he learned of what had happened in the armored division through General Juste.

As a result of these two communications, General Quintana ordered the special operations group of the army DOT alerted. He ordered the units of the armored division restricted to their barracks and put all of the other units of region one, through his general staff commander, on alert pending receipt of further information on the situation.

As a result of the above orders, the detachment occupying the Popular Radio withdrew immediately, and that which had seized the RTVE also was due at 2100 hours.

At 1845 hours, the captain general also passed on to General Torres Rojas the order from the captain general of the eighth region to report immediately to his office in La Coruna. General Torres Rojas carried out this order.

Within the command jurisdiction of the captain general of the first military region, no further incident occurred, except the escape of the military police unit of the armored division, at about 0100 hours, which, led by Commander Pardo Zancada, presented itself at the Congressional Palace and joined those occupying it.

Commander Pardo and the officials accompanying him entered the Congressional Palace to join in solidarity with Lieutenant Colonel Tejero, the head of the seizing forces. During the course of the night, the captain general sent two detachments in the hope of obtaining a change of attitude on the part of Commander Pardo, both with negative results.

The Events in the Third Region

At 0800 hours on 23 February, in accordance with previous orders from the captain general, a meeting was held with the colonel who was second in command of the military district commanders general staff, the colonel commanding the third Maestrazgo division general staff, and the lieutenant colonel commanding the operations section of that same division's general staff participating.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss various alert exercises planned for the last week of February 1981. At the meeting, the various types of alert were prepared, just as the captain general had ordered. Red alert, or alert 3, for Operation Diana, was decided upon for that same day, as the captain general had previously ordered. At that meeting, the composition of the various groups involved and the sites or zones to which they should proceed were discussed and determined.

In the following hours, the commanders of the third Maestrazgo division took steps to implement the red alert order in the units under their command. At 2135 hours, Captain General Milans del Bosch summoned the colonel who was second in command of the general staff to his office and told him of his concern about the report recently received on the situation. He concluded by entrusting to him the drafting of a communique or statement, which would be the declaration of a state of emergency, specifying the basic and separate points in that document. The captain general also commented on the possibility of confining the troops to quarters. The colonel responded that this was not necessary in Castellon and Valencia, because an alert exercise was planned for that same day. The general commanding the third Maestrazgo division, General Leon Pizarro, already knew of this exercise through his general staff commander.

At 1020 hours, the captain general summoned to his office the general commanding his general staff, the colonel who was second in command and the four general staff section heads. The first mentioned and the last four were completely unaware of why they had been summoned. General Milans del Bosch took the floor and explained to them that he had summoned the general and commanders to tell them of a decision which had to be adopted, and in the responsibility for which he did not share and of which he wanted to tell them of his views. He said that the situation in Spain was very serious; an event, bloodless of course, might occur in Madrid, in which connection they must be alert. He said that he had informed General Armada, whose fidelity to the crown was not in doubt, that the king was aware of everything. He ordered the colonel who was second in command of the general staff to read the statement he had ordered drafted an hour earlier to guarantee peace and order for the citizenry in a power vacuum situation if such occurred. He stressed that this document did not involve a declaration of a state of siege or emergency, and that his intention was to remain within the framework of the constitution; that he did not at that time support this decision, but that events which there was no possibility of halting had precipitated it; and that the only solution was to attempt to reorient events and above all to avoid bloodshed.

Finally, he announced, as Commander Pardo of the armored division later confirmed, that General Armada had gone to the Zarzuela Palace once the incident had occurred, and that he would give specific instructions from there, again speaking for his majesty.

Throughout the morning there were various steps taken and orders issued in connection with the holding of the planned alert exercise, and on the part of the general staff commanders, in connection with the distribution of the statement which the captain general had drafted for the radio broadcasting stations and the mass media. Detailed, sealed orders were sent to the general commanding the third Maestrazgo division through a general staff captain of the captaincy general.

At 1530 hours, the general commanding the Maestrazgo division, General Leon Pizarro, traveled from Marines to Betera to check on the radio communications as a result of the deployment of technical groups established for action.

At 1630 hours, the generals in command of the Valencia garrison were summoned to a meeting at the captaincy general at 1730 hours. That meeting was held on schedule, with the general commanding the Third Military Region general staff, the general serving as military governor of the garrison and province of Valencia, the general commanding the third Maestrazgo division and other generals, commanders and engineers participating.

At that meeting, General Milans del Bosch explained the following: that an act of force about which he could not go into detail, but which was known to his majesty the king, would occur in Madrid, and that as of that moment a statement would be published to guarantee order and safety for the citizenry. He proceeded to read the statement, stressing that it would only be in effect for the time essential to guarantee order once General Armada had reached the Zarzuela Palace. The activities of all political parties would be prohibited, because this was not a question of a right-wing movement, but of the establishment of a government to be headed by Armada with all parties participating.

When asked by those present why he spoke of a power vacuum, Lieutenant General Milans del Bosch answered that since the time had nearly come, he could now say that the seizure of the parliament was involved and that the full cabinet was meeting there. At almost that same moment, the colonel who was second in command of the general staff arrived to announce that the parliament was already being seized.

Immediately, taking advantage of the perplexity of those present, Milans ordered Caruana to proceed to the civil government offices and to take charge, and to make contact with the commanders of the naval and air sectors to inform them of the situation. General Caruana asked that General Milans del Bosch himself inform the civil governor. At 1830 hours a statement was sent to the Valencia radio broadcasting stations for re-transmission, and the general staff was given the password "miguelote" [militia rifleman], signaling that the planned action could proceed.

At 1900 hours, Lieutenant General Milans del Bosch had heard from the lieutenant general commanding the army general staff by telephone, who at that time was not yet aware of the true attitude of his interlocutor. Lieutenant General Gabeiras informed General Milans del Bosch that, in view of the circumstances, he was ordering an Operation Diana number two alert, which order would subsequently be confirmed by telex. And he asked him if any military units had gone into the streets.

To this question General Milans del Bosch responded that no military units had gone into the streets, and that an effort was being made to insure that nothing would happen to Lieutenant Colonel Tejero and his guards. He asked where General Armada was, to which the commander of the army general staff responded that he was with him. General Gabeiras was not in a position to verify this statement.

At 1930 hours, the civilian radio broadcasting stations began to broadcast the statement. At 1930 hours the first telephone conversation between Lieutenant Colonel Tejero, who was at the congress and highly excited, with the colonel who was second in command of the general staff had also occurred. The exchange was tense and difficult, and during it the national police colonel suggested that the congress be surrounded, and the recommendation from Valencia was that, above all, bloodshed be avoided.

At 1945 hours, when the same password--miguelete--was received from the general in command of the general staff, the general in command of the third Maestrazgo division proceeded to open the envelope containing his orders, which had arrived at 1930 hours.

At that same hour, the military authorities and those of the security forces began arriving at the captaincy general. In an atmosphere of complete perplexity, they placed themselves under the orders of General Milans del Bosch. At 1945 hours, General Gabeiras called General Milans again. The statement had now come out, and he told him that he had removed the troops from his command and was taking steps with a view to his removal. The role played by General Milans del Bosch in the frustrated coup was beginning to be very clear. General Milans del Bosch answered that he would only speak with General Armada.

At 1947 hours, after Lieutenant General Gabeiras had informed his majesty the king of the above, and asked him to ratify his orders to General Milans del Bosch, the chief of the general staff himself heard his majesty's harsh confirmation of these orders.

At 1950 hours, the unloading of ammunition at the gates began. At 2100 hours, the scheduled units began to move out into the streets of Valencia, reaching their points of destination between 2225 and 2230 hours.

Between 2230 hours and 2300 hours, General Gabeiras attempted to reach General Leon Pizarro, commander of the third Maestrazgo division, but he was unsuccessful.

At 2250 hours, the general commanding the general staff of the captaincy general ordered that the radios cease broadcasting the statement, simply announcing instead that it continued in effect and that supplementary instructions would be issued.

At 2330 hours a telex was received from his majesty the king, addressed to all the captaincies general of the eleven military regions, naval and air zones, reading as follows:

"In view of the situation created by the events which occurred at the Congress Palace, and to avoid any possible confusion, I confirm that I have ordered the civilian authorities and the General Staff Commanders' Council to take all the steps necessary to maintain constitutional order within the existing legal structure. Any step of a military nature which may possibly have to be taken must have the approval of the General Staff Commanders' Council (JUJEM). I request that you confirm to me that you have passed this on to all the army authorities."

Milans initialed the confirmation of receipt of the document sent directly to his majesty. He did not pass on its text to the commanders and officers under his jurisdiction.

At 0030 hours approximately, the commander of the army general staff, General Gabeiras, reached the military governors of Alicante and Castellon by telephone, ordering them to come to Valencia and proceed to arrest General Milans del Bosch. Both obeyed the orders, after they were informed of the situation. Gabeiras gave a similar order to the military governor of Valencia, General Caruana, who left immediately for the headquarters of the captaincy general.

At 0045 hours on 24 February, a telephone conversation took place between Lieutenant Colonel Tejero and General Milans del Bosch. Tejero informed General Milans that General Armada was with him and had asked him to be allowed onto the floor of the congress to speak to the deputies and propose to them the creation of a government which he, General Armada, would head. Tejero said that he opposed this proposal, and that he only wanted and could expect the establishment of a military junta with General Milans del Bosch himself presiding. General Milans answered that he did not want to be a protagonist at all and told Tejero to do as General Armada asked. Tejero did not obey this instruction, but rejected General Armada's proposal.

After Tejero's refusal, the colonial second in command of the Third Military Region spoke on the telephone in an effort to persuade Tejero, but he was unsuccessful. At 0130 hours, his majesty the king talked on the telephone with General Milans del Bosch, ordering him to withdraw the troops, which order General Milans immediately transmitted. General Caruana, who in accordance with orders from General Gabeiras attempted to arrest and remove General Milans for insubordination, participated in the conversation. The efforts of General Caruana were frustrated by General Milans' attitude. General Caruana asked for permission to communicate with General Gabeiras, and did so, informing him of General Milans' refusal to allow himself to be arrested and his decision to withdraw the troops from the streets.

At 0123 hours, a 2-minute appearance by his majesty the king which had been recorded between 2330 hours and 0026 hours was telecast. The coup had by then been practically put down and the seizure of the congress limited.

Toward 0130 hours, the president of the General Staff Commanders' Council and General Gabeiras were informed of the king's talk with General Milans del Bosch and the decision of the latter to withdraw the troops. At that same hour, his majesty spoke again with General Milans, ordering him to withdraw the statement and to cancel the state of emergency in Valencia and the Third Military Region.

At 0230 hours, another telex message was received at the office of the captain general in Valencia confirming the last telephone conversation and reading as follows: "Confirming telephone conversation we have just had, I want you to have a clear understanding of the following:

- "1. I assert my categorical decision to maintain constitutional order within the existing legal structure; after this message I can no longer turn back.
- "2. No coup d'etat can invoke the protection of the king, but is against the king.
- "3. Today more than ever I am determined to honor my pledge to the flag most conscientiously, thinking only of Spain. I order you to withdraw the units you have mobilized.

"4. I order you to tell Tejero to abandon his attitude.

"5. I swear that I will neither abdicate the crown nor abandon Spain; he who rebels is promoting the provocation of a state of civil war and must bear the responsibility for this.

"6. I do not doubt the love of my generals for Spain. Speaking for Spain, first, and for the crown, second, I command you to carry out my orders."

At 0345 hours, General Milans del Bosch asked his closest collaborators for their views, and they unanimously advised him to withdraw the statement.

At 0434 hours, General Armada, on the orders of General Gabeiras, also asked General Milans to withdraw the statement.

At 0445 hours, General Milans decided to issue a communique withdrawing the statement. The civilian governor of Valencia was informed of this measure by telephone, and it was communicated a few minutes later to the secretary to his majesty the king, General Sabino Fernandez Campos.

At 0510 hours, the preceding telephone conversation was confirmed by telex.

Now, although precise details are not available, a very tense conversation ensued between General Milans del Bosch and Director of State Security Laina, during which the latter is said to have informed General Milans of the responsibility he would bear if he did not persuade Tejero to abandon his rebellious attitude and if the GEO attacked the congress. Laina probably provided the telephone numbers that General Milans could use to reach Lieutenant Colonel Tejero.

At 0700 hours, General Milans del Bosch retired to his quarters, after suggesting to his colleagues that if any further contact were made with Tejero, he be persuaded to abandon his attitude once and for all without any violence.

At 1040 hours, Tejero tried for the last time to reach General Milans del Bosch. He talked with the colonel who was second in command of the general staff, who informed Tejero that General Milans del Bosch and the commander of the general staff were not there, and that he should try to reach General Armada in order to resolve the problem of the congress, because the orders of the king were being resolutely and precisely carried out in Valencia. Tejero insisted on talking with General Milans. The second in command of the general staff in Valencia insisted in turn that Tejero must speak with General Armada and that General Milans would only go to Madrid if so ordered by his majesty the king. After a certain resistance on the part of Tejero, he finally agreed that if contact was made with General Armada, he would talk with him. The Valencia general staff colonel then called Madrid and talked with General Perez Inigo, telling him that Tejero had agreed to talk with General Armada with a view to ending the seizure of the congress. There were doubts at the general army headquarters about the possibility of negotiations between Armada and Tejero, remembering Lieutenant Colonel Tejero's attitude toward General Armada in the early morning hours. In the end, General Armada said that he would ask General Gabeiras for permission to talk with Tejero again. Nothing more was learned in Valencia nor was there any further contact with Madrid. The officers there learned the outcome of the events from the radio.

Seizure of the Congress of Deputies

The seizure of the congress, carried out exclusively by members of the Civil Guard, had some background, beginning on the morning of the 23d, involving mainly 4 units and departments of the body from which the personnel used in the action came. First Mobile Command, Automotive Vehicle Fleet, Traffic Group and Traffic Academy.

First Mobile Command. In Valdemoro, at 1300 hours, Lieutenant Alonso Arnais, after previously studying the files of the personnel in his squadron and consulting with three of the subofficers involved, ordered a notice posted on the bulletin board listing the personnel expected to form up at 1600 hours for instruction and assignment. At the scheduled time, Captain Munecas Aguilar ordered a 2-70 submachine gun issued to each of those assembled, and, accompanied by the group, he departed at 1700 hours in a microbus for the headquarters of the mobile command on Batalla del Salado Street in Madrid. When the members of the group noticed that the microbus was not proceeding toward the assigned destination, they spoke to the conductor. Captain Munecas then told them: "There is a counterorder. The installation of Calvo Sotelo has been moved up and it is feared that something like Guernica will occur. It is necessary to protect the king. We are going to the parliament." Later, the group arrived at the congress when the first events had already taken place, and it was assigned to guard the doors and accompany deputies to the various departments.

Automotive Vehicle Fleet. During the morning, Lieutenant Colonel Tejero was seen in this department, which was not unusual. He was scheduled to lead an expedition later. Colonel Manchado, the fleet commander, ordered an unscheduled weapons inspection for the Second Workshop Company for 1600 hours. At 1400 hours, Colonel Manchado ordered First Corporal Jose Garcia de la Torre to take the necessary drivers to an industrial warehouse in Puenlabrada, from which they would drive six vehicles stationed there to the fleet headquarters. At 1600 hours the weapons inspection for the second company took place, and volunteers were requested to participate in an antiterrorist action. Colonel Manchado is reported to have said more or less that Spain was experiencing difficult moments, and the time had come to take the Civil Guard into the streets to establish a presence. Finally, toward 1715 hours, nine vehicles--four private automobiles and five official cars--departed with the bulk of the troops who were to participate in the action, taken from the second company of the Automotive Vehicle Fleet, the Traffic Group and the Traffic Academy. The second company force was assigned to guard the streets closest to the palace, on arrival at the congressional premises, a task to which it remained assigned until 1930 hours, when Director General Aramburu Topete ordered the men to get into the vehicles and withdraw. Immediately a captain and a lieutenant reversed the order, forcing the members of this company to enter the congressional building.

Traffic Group. The troops participating in this unit were recruited from among the various detachments assigned to the subsector by Captain Abad, who ordered the recruits to gather at the automotive vehicle fleet premises for a weapons inspection at 1600 hours. When that time came, Captain Abad told them not to worry, that he was solely in charge, since the Civil Guards, when implementing the orders of their commanders, are exempt from all responsibility according to an article in the Military Justice Code. He then sent them off in vehicles to the congress, and a part of it was the most active group in the events which occurred.

Traffic Academy. The traffic and driving course personnel who were in the bar at the barracks between 1700 and 1730 hours, some 55 individuals, were ordered to gather in one of the classrooms by Sergeant Sanchez Martin. Once there, he issued weapons and ammunition to them, stating that their services were needed at the congress to maintain public order. He then sent them off in vehicles, and together with the other personnel mentioned above, they all proceeded to the congress building. Once there, they were assigned to exterior guard duty. When the director general ordered their withdrawal, 17 of these individuals got into the vehicles. This is a brief account of how the members of the Civil Guard who participated in the action were recruited and transported.

Events at the Congress Building

At 1822 hours, as has been said repeatedly, the congress was seized by Lieutenant Colonel Tejero and his men, still claiming to be acting in the name of General Milans del Bosch and under orders from the king. The Civil Guard uniforms and the fact that they stated they were acting on behalf of the king were, according to the reports we have received to date, the determining factors in the ease with which the Congress of Deputies was taken over. At 1823 hours, the director general of the Civil Guard, General Aramburu Topete, was informed of the seizure of the congress by forces at the institute. The first to attempt to persuade Lieutenant Colonel Tejero to abandon his attitude was Colonel Alcala Galiano, commander of the national police forces, who went to the congress building immediately after the seizure.

The colonel, who was unaware of what was happening and above all of its significance, was personally informed by General Gabeiras of the falsity of the claim that Lieutenant Colonel Tejero was acting on behalf of his majesty the king, and he ordered him to persuade Tejero to desist, but he was unsuccessful. General Aramburu, once the facts were known, took the proper steps for control of the zone of attack, bearing the following in mind: the attacking force was unmistakably a part of the Civil Guard, which had the duty of repressing their action. From what the first reports indicated, the force involved in the seizure came from the Traffic Group and a part of the Automotive Vehicle Fleet. As a result of the above, General Aramburu stayed in telephone contact with Colonel Manchado, commander of the Automotive Vehicle Fleet of the Civil Guard, to discuss details as to the accuracy of these first emergency reports. That colonel replied that he had ordered the move because someone had told him that this was an order from the director general himself and General Armada. Not only did General Aramburu tell him that this report was false, but he remonstrated with Colonel Manchado and ordered him to proceed immediately to the congress to withdraw the force under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Tejero and to receive orders there from the director general.

Colonel Manchado did not appear, for which reason the subdirector general of the body was ordered to arrest him. Next, General Aramburu, after establishing his permanent command post at the headquarters of the general Civil Guard office on Guzman el Bueno Street, and passing on the reports received to the Ministry of Interior, went to the Congress Palace, accompanied by his two aides, his private secretary and the lieutenant colonel commanding the special services, with three escorts, arriving there at approximately 1910 hours. When General Aramburu reached the congress building, he noticed six vehicles with civilian plates there as well as a number of guards, which at first estimate seemed to total between 100 and 200, on the sidewalk near the autobuses. Backed by the commanders and escorts with him, General Aramburu ordered that

the guards immediately get into the vehicles, which order the majority obeyed. Immediately afterward, General Aramburu and his companions entered the access tunnel to the congress building, with the intention of locating Lieutenant Colonel Tejero who, according to the first reports, commanded the seizure. Almost immediately Lieutenant Colonel Tejero was found, in a state of great excitement, with pistol in hand and seemingly ready to fire. He was accompanied by another official and other members of the Civil Guard, similarly threatening in manner, and also in the grip of great tension.

General Aramburu approached Lieutenant Colonel Tejero, whom he ordered to abandon his attitude. Tejero answered that he was ready for anything, and that before surrendering he would kill General Aramburu. He then fired one shot. The director general of the Civil Guard attempted to draw his regulation weapon, but was prevented by an aide-de-camp, who had noted that three of the corps members accompanying Lieutenant Tejero had set up their automatic weapons in firing position and were aiming. Simultaneously, General Aramburu was able to see that a lieutenant and some corporals of the civil guard were emptying the vehicles, now occupied by the majority of the troops who had obeyed the order given by the director general on his arrival.

In view of this situation, General Aramburu decided to keep a cool head and to avoid an exchange of fire, which would probably have provided the spark which would have ignited the fray and led to a massacre of the deputies and ministers being held on the floor of the congress. General Aramburu chose to persuade the less bold to return to the vehicles, an order which only about 50 obeyed, returning immediately to the Automotive Vehicle Fleet in 2 of the vehicles. Thus, out of the 288 men who had initially accompanied Lieutenant Colonel Tejero, there remained some 220 in the congress building and in the environs.

[19 Mar 81, pp 17-18]

[Text] On these two pages we carry the last part of the report read by Minister of Defense Alberto Oliart on Tuesday to a closed-door session of the Congress of Deputies. Because of time considerations, this second part of the recording of the minister's address obtained by EL PAIS could not be included in our first issue yesterday, although it was included in the Madrid edition. We interrupted the report yesterday at the point at which Lieutenant Colonel Tejero remained entrenched in the Congress Palace with some 220 Civil Guards. Late at night a kind of command post had been set up at the adjacent Palace Hotel by Lieutenant General Aramburu, director general of the Civil Guard, and General Saens de Santamaria, national police inspector. At midnight, General Armada entered the congress building alone and talked with Tejero for more than an hour. Later, General Armada, accompanied by the civilian governor of Madrid, Mariano Nicolas, proceeded to the headquarters of the provisional cabinet.

At 0135 hours, General Armada and the civilian governor of Madrid reached Amador de los Rios. Once inside Mr Lains's office, all the others, with the exception of Sanchez Harguindeguy and Mariano Nicolas, were asked to leave. During this interview General Armada made the following statements: "The king was wrong. The king has compromised the crown by divorcing himself from the armed forces. This is a military

affair which we military must resolve. A solution must be found. All of these statements were by way of commentary on Mr Laina's refusal to accept the anticonstitutional solution proposed by General Armada. Mr Laina called the Zarzuela Palace and stated that General Armada was with him. He spoke to General Babino Fernandez Campos for some 30 seconds, and General Armada realized that there was not the slightest hope that his proposal to Lieutenant Colonel Tejero that an emergency government which he would head be established would be accepted, much less with the support of the king.

Later, at 0230 hours, General Armada returned to army headquarters, still accompanied by the civilian governor, Mariano Nicolas, where he remained until his further and final efforts with Tejero, well into the morning and on the orders of his superiors. At army headquarters, he recounted his talks with Lieutenant Colonel Tejero, but made no further steps or plans.

Toward 0005 hours, the state security director, Mr Laina, went to the command post of the palace and under his direction a review of the problem was undertaken, with a study of the possibilities for action, and it was decided that if violent intervention were necessary, it would be undertaken by the GEO and the national police, in order to avoid a clash between comrades within the Civil Guard itself.

In the subsequent hours, efforts were steadfast to effect a change in the attitude of Lieutenant Colonel Tejero, as well as those confined with him, who at the end of this time were Captain Menendez Vives, Commander Pardo Zancada, and the officers who accompanied the military police units of the armored division. Lieutenant Colonel Tejero proved adamant, while Commander Pardo was inclined to accept the Armada proposal. It was now clear, however, that the surrender of the holdouts, who were absolutely alone toward 0800 hours, would occur soon. It was necessary, then, to proceed with extreme caution.

At 0950 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Fuentes Gomez de Salazar, a great friend of Commander Zancada, offered to talk with him. After an introduction to General Aramburu, he was authorized to do so. At 1040 hours, as was mentioned in the summary of events in Valencia, Lieutenant Colonel Tejero made a last effort to speak with General Milans. He was unsuccessful and after an argument on the telephone with the colonel who was second in command of the third region general staff, he agreed to talk with General Armada to negotiate the terms of surrender.

At 1045 hours on 24 February, Armada finally went to the congress with the mission, assigned him by the council of general staff commanders, to offer the attackers some concessions if they would avoid further harm to their hostages. Between 1055 hours and 1110 hours, General Armada talked with Lieutenant Colonel Tejero, assisted by the efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Fuentes Gomez de Salazar, who spoke with Commander Pardo Zancada. At 1115 hours, General Armada called the president of the General Staff Commanders' Council from the congress to read him the conditions which the holdouts had initially proposed for their surrender. These conditions were as follows:

The military police unit of the armored division column were to depart last from the zone where their vehicles were parked, proceeding in a motorized column to surrender at El Pardo, the general headquarters of the armored division.

No blame would be assigned to subofficers from lieutenant on down. There would be no photographers, their route would be clear and two drivers would escort them. Lieutenant

Colonel Tejero wanted General Armada to come, and that no responsibility be assigned to the subofficers and Civil Guards. No officer requested permission to leave the country.

Lieutenant Colonel Tejero wanted to depart by car and surrender at the general headquarters of the corps, and that any penalties imposed on officers be carried out at military prisons.

Captain Menendez made the same request as Colonel Tejero, expressing the desire to surrender at the Naval Ministry.

At 1120 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Tejero informed the deputies that a solution was imminent. At 1125 hours, the president of the General Staff Commanders' Council accepted the conditions, after consulting with his majesty the king, who expressed his agreement. At noon the deputies, on the orders of the president of the congress, Landelino Lavilla, began to emerge, after almost 18 hours in confinement. At 1234 hours the general telephoned to report the complete evacuation of the congress, and he returned to the land army barracks. The separate confinement of the acting president and vice president of the cabinet within the congress, along with some deputies, and other incidents involving the deputies, have been omitted from the account here, since you gentlemen are fully familiar with them.

Acting Cabinet

Toward 1950 hours, at the suggestion of Sanchez Arguindey, an acting cabinet was appointed to maintain constant contact both with the Zarzuela Palace and the General Staff Commanders' Council. Previously, the state security director, Francisco Laina, had talked with his majesty the king, obtaining the specific orders necessary to resolve the situation as speedily as possible.

Laina made contact with the civilian governors, giving them orders for the permanent establishment of the security council. He made haste to reach Generals Aramburu and Saenz de Santamaria, director general of the Civil Guard and inspector general of the national police respectively, asking the former to proceed to the congress and the second to remain for the time being in his office and dispatch units to the zone. After the frustrated first effort by General Aramburu to dissuade Lieutenant Colonel Tejero from his intentions, Laina talked with him by telephone for the same purpose. Tejero told him that he would obey no further orders except from Generals Milans and Armada, whereupon he ended the telephone call. As of that time, Laina was persuaded that the events at the congress were related to those in Valencia, of which he had news through the communications maintained with the civilian governor in that province. Later, Francisco Laina made telephone contact for the first time with Lieutenant General Milans del Bosch, whom he reprimanded for his attitude. In one of the talks Laina had with his majesty the king, the latter said that he did not trust General Armada, that he lacked any personal authorization from him, and that any attitude he adopted or efforts he made were carried out on his own account and on his own responsibility.

Toward 2130 hours, the acting cabinet issued a statement which was immediately carried by the mass communications media. Following the message from the king, Laina talked with Lieutenant General Milans, who told him not to worry, that the king's orders would be obeyed. Laina spoke in strong terms to General Milans, telling him that if he felt called upon to attack the congress, he alone, General Milans, would be responsible for whatever ensued. The subsequent events have been more than fully covered.

The Council of General Staff Commanders

At 1830 hours on 23 February, the president of the council, Air Force Lieutenant General Alfaro Arregui, made the decision to regard the JUJEM as meeting in permanent session. As of that time, each general staff commander was ordered to make contact with the captaincies general in his military, naval or air region or zone. At 1920 hours, Operation Diana proceeded to grade two, and his majesty the king was informed that the liberal Admiral Lucini, undersecretary of defense, had been incorporated in the acting ministerial cabinet organized at the Ministry of Interior. At 2025 hours, Lieutenant General Gabeiras, president of the JUJEM, decided that the members of the council should proceed to its general headquarters and that the general quarters should be left in the charge of the second in command of each general staff.

The council made contact with Lieutenant General Milans del Bosch to persuade him to withdraw his statement and heed the provisions called for by Diana Alert 2. He refused to do so, and the president of the JUJEM informed his majesty the king of this fact, and the latter said that he would personally talk with General Milans del Bosch.

General Gabeiras had ordered the withdrawal of the squadron which had occupied the RTVE at the beginning of Operation Diana. At that time he also talked with the military governor of Cartagena, General Fortea, ordering him to coordinate his actions with those of the captain general of the Mediterranean Naval Zone. At 2130 hours, General Gabeiras returned to his general quarters, after having heard the first reports of the possible involvement of General Armada. He also reached agreement with Francisco Laina on the issuing of two statements, one by the acting cabinet and the other by the JUJEM. Mr Robles Piquer, secretary of state for foreign affairs, appeared personally three times throughout the night and early hours of the morning before the council to report to it on the cabinet actions and the existing situation.

At 2255 hours, immediately after the message sent by his majesty the king to all the captaincies general became known, the JUJEM issued a statement reading as follows: "The JUJEM asserts that, in view of the events which have occurred at the Congress Palace, it has taken all the steps necessary to repel any attack upon the constitution and to reestablish the order for which it provides."

Toward 0004 hours, State Security Director Laina appeared before the council to exchange views about the possibility of forceful intervention in the congress by the GEO, using armored military vehicles. He also reported on his talks with Lieutenant General Milans on his lack of confidence concerning Armada's attitude, without specifying the reasons for it, although he hinted that it was a question of certain views voiced in connection with the situation.

The JUJEM maintained contact throughout the night with the king, with Francisco Laina and with the chief of the general staff of the land army, who had command on the peninsula and in the Balearic Islands for Operation Diana.

After 1000 hours and receipt of the report that a number of Civil Guards left the congress building, it was learned that General Armada, authorized by the JUJEM, was now in the congress talking with Tejero, and that conditions had been proposed for the surrender of the remaining holdouts. After the president of the JUJEM had consulted with the king, the conditions were accepted, and Generals Armada and Aramburu, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Tejero, signed the documents pertaining to the surrender.

The Army General Staff Command

At 1822 hours, the commander of the army general staff, General Gabeiras, was engaged in ordinary business in his office with his second in command, Major General Armada Comyn. When news of the attack on the congress had been received, he reached the captain general of the First Military Region, Lieutenant General Quintana Lacaci, by telephone, ordering him to alert the First Operative Territorial Defense Brigade and the Regional Operations Group, and to locate General Juste, head of the armored division. At 1840 hours, he had his first telephone talk with his majesty the king and reported to him on the steps taken. Five minutes later, almost simultaneously, General Gabeiras called the captains general of the Third Military Region--Milans' attitude was not yet known at all--and the seventh region in Valladolid. He ordered them to effect an alert without causing alarm. At 1920 hours, unaware of General Milans' true attitude, General Armada suggested to General Gabeiras, in view of the number of telephone calls to be made, that he, Armada, proceed to his own office to facilitate these communications. General Gabeiras did not agree and ordered Armada to remain with him.

In the following moments, almost all of the captains general were reached by telephone, and General Gabeiras knew that the king was doing the same thing simultaneously. Some of the captains general reported that General Milans had called them to inform them of the publication of his statement. Between 1942 and 1945 hours, General Gabeiras talked twice with Milans, and at 1947 hours, he talked directly with his majesty the king, urging him to confirm to General Milans the orders he had given him.

At about 2140 hours, according to the witnesses who were present, with General Gabeiras, who had gone to the JUJEM, still absent from his office, General Armada had a telephone talk with General Milans. These witnesses say that General Armada murmured "this can't be, this is impossible."

Almost immediately, Gabeiras returned and asked General Armada what had happened during his absence. Armada responded that the situation was very serious, since the second, fourth, fifth and seventh regions were supporting General Milans, the army was divided, and no solution could be seen but to establish a government he would head, to which end he was prepared to go to the Cortes and make this proposal, if he were authorized to do so. General Gabeiras immediately dismissed this information, because his majesty the king and the captain general of the First Military Region had maintained constant contact with the captains general, and he knew for a certainty that it was only Milans del Bosch who maintained the rebel posture.

General Gabeiras therefore told Armada, with the agreement of all those present, that his proposal was unconstitutional and unacceptable. Since General Armada was insistent, and since it was known by then that Tejero would not speak further except with General Milans and Armada, Gabeiras proposed to him that they both go to the congress so that Armada could make the proposal he suggested, but only in order to persuade Lieutenant Colonel Tejero to abandon his attitude. General Armada responded as follows to that suggestion: "I have never lied to anyone and I will not do so to Tejero."

The King Withdraws General Armada's Authority

Given this attitude on the part of General Armada, Gabeiras' suspicions strengthened, and he immediately reported them to the king. His majesty categorically rejected General Armada's proposal, ordering him not to come to the Zarzuela Palace.

The king then interrupted his talk with General Armada, who continued the conversation with General Fernandez del Campo. As General Gabeiras thought it desirable to establish some type of communication with Lieutenant Colonel Tejero, he authorized General Armada, despite his suspicions, to talk with the lieutenant colonel to offer concessions for his departure from the congress so that there would be no casualties, but he reiterated to General Armada that he was forbidden to make the proposal which his majesty had definitively rejected.

General Aramburu was informed that General Armada was proceeding to the congress with this mission. Meanwhile, General Gabeiras ordered the military governors of Valencia, Castellon and Alicante to proceed to arrest Milans del Bosch, in view of his attitude. They all accepted the order, understanding the magnitude of what was happening. At 0120 hours General Armada called General Gabeiras to report the failure of his efforts, but without mentioning the content of his talk with Lieutenant Colonel Tejero, in which, as has been reported, he did in fact make his proposal that a government he would head be established. He then went to the office of the president of the acting cabinet and later to the general quarters, which were being guarded by national police forces, in view of the evidence of his involvement in the events and the conversation held with Francisco Laina, state security director. During that conversation he recounted his proposal to Lieutenant Colonel Tejero that a government headed by himself be established. During the balance of the long night, the tension focused on the following actions:

The effort to persuade the commanders barricaded in the congress to change their attitude.

Maintaining contact with the captaincies general.

Participation in the talks with Lieutenant General Milans del Bosch in an effort to persuade him to abandon his attitude definitively.

At 1245 hours, Gabeiras talked by telephone with Minister of Defense Rodriguez Sahagun, who had now been released, informing him in general terms of what had happened during the night.

Decisive Action by the King

The actions taken by his majesty the king can only be summarized respectfully in a single word--decisive. The impeccable exercise of the supreme command of the armed forces entrusted to him by the constitution; the speed and energy of his command reflexes in connection with his immediate subordinates, his personal talks with them; the forcefulness and categorical nature of his orders; his firmness in maintaining constitutional order; the channeling of all military activity through the JUJEM--the highest collegiate joint military command body; the king's scrupulous respect for the civilian authorities, even in such difficult moments, with encouragement of the establishment of an acting cabinet with secretaries of state and undersecretaries, constitute an example of the exercise of the supreme majesty of the state and the respect for popular sovereignty.

Royal Decree No 277/1981, dated 26 February, appointed a togaed counselor, General Don Jose Maria Garcia Escudero, as a special judge with jurisdiction throughout the national territory for investigation of the case filed on 2 March. Added to this case under investigation was case No 1/81 charging Lieutenant General Don Jaime Milans del Bosch y Ussia and General Gabeiras Montero, head of the army general staff, with insubordination, as well as case No 2/81, resulting from the actions of Captain Don Camilo Menendez Vives.

Independent of the above, case No 72/81 was filed within the jurisdiction of the captaincy general of the First Military Region, charging Colonels Don Miguel Manchado Garcia and Don Jose Ignacio San Martin Lopez, Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio Jejero Molina and Commander Don Ricardo Pardo Zancada, as well as 11 captains, 8 lieutenants and citizen Juan Garcia Carres with authorship of the crime of military rebellion.

In the case being investigated by the special judge, indictments were filed on 8 and 11 March against Don Jaime Milans del Bosch y Ussia and General Don Alfonso Armada y Comyn, charged with authorship of the crime of military rebellion and ordering their preventive detention.

Where the Civil Guard is concerned, apart from the officers tried and sentenced to the Alcala de Henares military prison, a colonel, a lieutenant general, 7 captains and 8 lieutenants, plus one other individual tried for the crime of military sedition, Captain Don Gil Sanchez Valiente Portillo, 7 subofficers, 37 corporals and 8 privates, totaling 62, have been arrested and turned over to the military courts, and 227 are under house arrest and awaiting the disposition of the judge.

Apart from the court actions, each captaincy general has drafted a report on the events which occurred within its jurisdiction on 23 and 24 February last, which reports, along with that of the director general of the Civil Guard, I have used in drafting my explanation.

Ministry of Interior Investigations

The Ministry of Interior has established a mixed commission comprised of members of the state security bodies and forces, headed by a joint board, to investigate the possible responsibility of civilian individuals. Two work groups, one for information and another investigation, are functioning under this commission. The former is made up of personnel of the higher police corps, the Civil Guard and the national police, headed by voting members of the commission representing the corresponding head officers. The second group includes 12 inspectors of the higher police corps serving on 6 teams coordinated by a subcommissioner and headed directly by the president of the commission.

The special investigation group of the Civil Guard, headed by a commander and in constant communication with the president of the commission, has authority for specific action. Both work groups have the assistance of various central and peripheral units and the general police and Civil Guard headquarters.

The information group is using the recordings of the telephone calls made on 23 and 24 February, in accordance with the provisions of the existing legislation for emergency circumstances, the information provided by the general headquarters of the police and Civil Guard, as well as the general inspectorate of the national police, the documents obtained from the mass media, and the data and reports provided to this department by individuals and bodies unrelated to it and its working material.

The reference materials are being subjected to centralization, sorting, evaluation, interpretation, systematization, distribution and use in accordance with the usual techniques, in order to be able to identify specific members of the state security bodies and forces on duty or in the environs of the Palace of the Congress of Deputies on the dates involved in order to obtain new information and, where pertinent, to establish possible responsibility, to identify the individuals referred to in the documentation described, to establish their domiciles or whereabouts, the relations among them and to determine, in an initial phase, their possible complicity in a crime of military rebellion. Whatever information, data or reports prove of interest for the preliminary investigation will be turned over to the military court authorities, or if such is not the case, for the drafting of such reports as those authorities may order.

The investigative activities are currently focused on 114 persons mentioned during the telephone calls, 127 members of the state security bodies and forces, 23 civilians referred to repeatedly in journalistic reports, and an undetermined number of persons affiliated in one way or another with the purposes of the investigation being pursued.

The duties of the investigating group include the study of the systematized documentation, the preparation of files, obtaining evidence and the presentation of the full record to the military court authorities. Parallel with this, the investigation group is authorized to enlist the cooperation of the central and peripheral units of the general police and Civil Guard headquarters for the purpose of the full identification of individuals and the location of their domiciles.

Coordination will be carried out through the president of the commission described. The lines of action of this group are the following: investigation of the origin of the funds used to support the operation of seizing the Palace of the Congress of Deputies and the general financing of the planned coup d'etat; investigation of the relations among the civilians presumably involved in these events, and their relations with certain social and economic pressure groups; establishment of the presumable responsibility of members of the state security body and forces, civilians and groups.

Action has been taken to date against 29 civilians, 27 members of the higher national and other police bodies, and 289 members of the Civil Guard, against whom preliminary statements have been filed.

These special investigations are being pursued within the field of finance. An investigation is also being pursued to limit the responsibility of the individuals involved in the purchase and sale of the buses used for the Civil Guard troops which seized the Palace of the Congress of Deputies, in order to identify the actual persons who may be involved in the Almendros collective and to establish the existence of the Civil Guard statement which was to be published in the daily newspaper EL ALCAZAR on 24 February. Finally, the cause of the damage to the closed-circuit television at the Congress of Deputies on 23 February is being investigated.

In addition to the procedures mentioned, other judicial police cases are being pursued in Madrid, Malaga, Alicante and Castellon. Currently, one of the individuals whose arrest and preliminary investigation were undertaken by the higher police corps, Juan Garcia Carres, is being tried by the competent military court authorities. These authorities are adequately informed of the work being pursued by the commission

and its respective work groups, the members of which, for all intents and purposes, are its auxiliaries, in accordance with the legislation in effect on penal procedures.

The cases being investigated by the members of the judicial police are being turned over directly to the special general military court.

Gentlemen: from the facts set forth, you are familiar with the discussions and responsibilities of the main figures involved in the attempted coup d'etat on 23 and 24 February. Some important points remain to be clarified: the composition and identities of the members of the group, which signed, using the pseudonym Almendros, and the participation of civilians in the preparations and development of the coup. Investigations are continuing and will continue until a complete understanding of what occurred has been achieved. It is also clear from the facts set forth that the attempted coup d'etat failed mainly for two reasons: the first was the determined and decisive stance adopted by his majesty the king in defense of and to maintain constitutional order; the second was the loyalty and obedience to the constitution and the king of almost all of the armed forces and state security forces.

Solely due to time limitations, my report has not included all of the statements of support and loyalty received from each and every one of the captains general and commanders of units or the conversations between his majesty the king and the commanders of the army, naval and air force general staffs. But it was this overwhelming majority attitude which was imposed upon the attempted coup d'etat. The peril suffered by this chamber, and with it the constitutional order, democracy and freedom in Spain, was serious, very serious. The result has served to strengthen our institutions. Our people have demonstrated their commitment, without any hesitation, to democracy, the constitution, the institutions the constitution endorses, and the freedom which our norms and institutions guarantee.

Military Court Indicts General Torres Rojas

Torres Rojas, who was removed from his post as military governor of La Coruna, traveled to Madrid on the day of the attempted coup, on flight IB-754 from La Coruna to Madrid at 1400 hours, to be precise. In the afternoon he met with the general staff of the First Brunete Armored Division, which he headed until the end of January 1980. Troops from that division, specifically a military police unit from the El Pardo headquarters, joined the rebels in the early morning of 24 February. The indicted general was ordered transferred to the military government of La Coruna on 24 January 1980, in the midst of rumors of a possible frustrated military rebellion, reported in the testimony of Captain Tormo Rico, assigned to Melilla. These rumors were reported in DIARIO 16, and its then editor, Miguel Angel Aguilar, was summoned to testify before a military judge. Up to that date he had been commander of the First Brunete Armored Division, in which post he was replaced by General Juste. Torres Rojas is a native of Melilla and is 61 years old.

Attorney Guillermo Quintana Aparicio has undertaken the defense of General Torres Rojas. The attorney stated recently that he was a personal friend of the indicted man.

Official Commentary on Minister's Address

The secretary of state for information issued a statement last night pertaining to the report delivered by the minister of defense to the Congress of Deputies concerning the facts which occurred last 23 and 24 February. The statement read as follows:

"Between 1650 hours and 1805 hours, approximately, the minister of defense presented his report to the Congress of Deputies of the events which occurred last 23 and 24 February.

"This report was drafted on the basis of other partial reports obtained from the captaincies general of the first and third military regions (Madrid and Valencia), the Council of General Staff Commanders, the headquarters of the land army general staff, the general headquarters of the Civil Guard and the Ministry of Interior, all previously classified secret, although of course the information pertaining to the indictment under study was not used in drafting these documents. For this reason, and because of the classified nature of the material dealt with, the government asked and received permission from the chamber for the minister of defense to read his report in a closed session.

"Consistent with this decision, the government hopes that the secret nature of the session will be respected, with the support of all of the political forces with parliamentary representation."

Report Raises Unanswered Questions

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 21 Mar 81 p 13

[Article by Miguel Angel Aguilar: "Defense Minister's Report Raises Many Unanswered Questions on Military Coup"]

[Text] The Oliart report on the frustrated 23 February coup, delivered to the plenary session of the Congress of Deputies meeting in secret session on 17 March, and published the following day in EL PAIS, raises some unresolved questions, unless there are some errors in transcription, and enables us to establish the most important gaps in the official report, awaiting the fullest clarification in the course of the court cases initiated.

In the first of the scenarios, that at the First Brunete Armored Division, described by the defense minister, he pointed out, for example, that General Jose Juste stopped during his trip to Zaragoza at the Santa Maria de Huerta national tavern after a telephone call from the commander of the division general staff, Colonel Jose Ignacio San Martin, to his general headquarters. Who talked with Colonel San Martin? What justification did he give for demanding the immediate return of the general to the headquarters in El Pardo? How did the general fail to establish what these serious circumstances, which no one described to him in detail, were? Why was the captain general of the First Military Region, Guillermo Quintana Lacaci, not told of what seemed to be happening?

There was a meeting of commanders and officers of the Brunete division convoked at the request of General Torres Rojas, which began shortly after 1700 hours on 23 February and which the commanding general, Jose Juste, found in progress on his arrival. Then Colonel San Martin announced a very important matter which would be set forth by Commander Ricardo Pardo Zancada.

Pardo Zancada described his interview with Milans, the captain general of the Third Military Region, in Valencia the preceding evening, and explained that as of 1800 hours a very serious event would take place which would require the action of the first region to guarantee order and security. Torres Rojas confirmed what had been said. Then the division commanders noted that it was already very late and that at 1730 hours, because of the marching orders and troop review, they could not do what was asked of them. General Juste, who noted the need to inform the captain general of the First Military Region, was told that General Milans del Bosch was taking care of things. How can it be explained that no mention or demand to know what the constitutional provisions for emergency cases were, occurred among the commanders and officers meeting in El Pardo? Under these circumstances, what could be the meaning of the irregular form of contact with General Quintana Lacaci, supreme commander of the military region?

At that time, Quintana gave the order, which was passed on by Juste personally to each and every one of the Brunete commanders, to confine all units to their quarters. The order was carried out, but before it was passed on it was impossible to prevent the departure of some detachments of the 14th Villaviciosa Cavalry Regiment for the RTVE, and other units of the Mixed Engineers Regiment to the Popular Radio station. The Oliart report explains that the latter were withdrawn immediately, but the units seizing the RTVE under the command of Captain Merlo did not do so until 2100 hours. What difficulties prevented communication with Captain Merlo from 1900 hours until 2100 hours? What instructions did that officer have concerning his mission at the RTVE? Was his decision to interrupt the news programs and to order military music broadcast connected with the provisions of Operation Diana, the purpose of which was to be the military protection of the RTVE? What explanation has been requested for all of this? Why did Merlo reject the suggestion of the RTVE officials that he get in touch with General Juste or General Sabino Fernandez del Campo?

All of the questions posed about the meeting of Brunete commanders and officers fully apply to the session convoked by Milans del Bosch at the captaincy general in Valencia at 1630 hours. When the generals commanding the garrison heard the detailed expectations of Milans about the events which would occur that same afternoon, and the decision to issue a proclamation, which was read to them, none of them raised the constitutional question, concerning which no one can claim ignorance, because the Royal Ordinances themselves, in article 26, provide that "every military man must know and strictly observe the obligations set forth in the constitution."

It is particularly difficult to understand why Lieutenant Colonel Tejero, who had planned his seizure action at the Congress of Deputies so carefully with the captain general of Valencia, did not then accept the role assigned to General Armada, who would offer the deputies a government he headed, with the participation of all parties. According to the explanation Milans gave his generals in Valencia shortly before Tejero's seizure, these were the plans. Why then didn't Tejero agree to them?

All of this pertains to the most important events on 23 and 24 February. There remains to be explained, finally and most important, the contents, plans and persons involved in the major military coup to which Oliart refers in his report, and the details of the coup Tejero promoted.

Colonel Castillejo Arrested in Valencia

Colonel Juan Castillejo, the duke of Monteleagre, was arrested two months ago and detained by the captain general of the Third Military Region, Antonio Pascual Calmes. The reason for the arrest of Cavalry Colonel Castillejo was apparently that he absented himself from his office without the proper official permission.

Colonel Castillejo was seen at the Congress of Deputies talking with Lieutenant Colonel Tejero last 23 February, during the attempted military coup. Also it is known that the colonel was at the military riding school during the evening, and on occasion his name has been mentioned in connection with a frustrated military rebellion last year.

Although the official reasons for his arrest have not yet been made public, the detention for two months imposed for absence from his office is considered excessive in military circles.

Detention with Colonel Ibanez

Colonel Castillejo is being held in the same military department as Colonel Diego Ibanez, second in command of the Valencia general staff, who was arrested two days ago for the drafting of the statement issued in connection with the coup by Milans del Bosch. The two colonels are being held in the premises of the Third Valencia Mixed Engineers Regiment.

The information office at the Ministry of Defense made public an official statement on the arrest of Colonel Diego Ibanez yesterday. To date, there has been no official statement about the arrest of Colonel Castillejo.

5157

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3110/109

3110/109-A

SECOND FIRM FOUND TO HAVE TRAINED LIBYANS IN MILITARY AREA

Taught Radar, Computer Subjects

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 29 Apr 81 p 9

[Text] New Telub affair. Chief of DAGENS NYHETER heard by the Riksdag. Even during the time of the social democratic government a firm was given permission to train Libyan military personnel. The privately owned consultant firm Teleplan received permission in September 1975 to send instructors in data processing and radar techniques to Libya.

This information was disclosed by the former under secretary of the Ministry of Trade, Bengt Dennis, who is now the chief editor of DAGENS NYHETER.

The training was approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Industry and the National Industrial Council. The War Materials Inspector was doubtful.

Bengt Dennis was questioned on Tuesday by the Riksdag constitutional committee on the Teleplan affair, which was disclosed in connection with the Telub affair.

Many Subjects

"According to my appointment calendar I had a visit from the head of Teleplan in September 1975, but I can not remember the purpose. As under secretary it is conservatively estimated that I considered 30 different subjects each day, 10,000 each year, and I held that post for 6.5 years," said Bengt Dennis.

Anders Bjork (conservative), chairman of the committee, said, "Social democrats have criticized the bourgeois ministers, for example Karin Soder, for having forgotten matters in the Telub affair. Now perhaps they understand that it is not so easy to remember events after 3 or 4 years."

Teleplan's training took place in 1977. Two instructors were sent to Libya to train military personnel in electronics. Between 10 and 15 Libyan officers received basic training in data processing and radar, among other things.

Desire for the Truth

Bengt Gunnar was asked whether he thought the conservatives' interrogation of him was an attempt to direct return fire against social democratic criticism of the bourgeois cabinet ministers' handling of the Telub affair. He replied, "No, I am convinced that politicians are driven by a desire for the truth which is without equal."

Also on Tuesday there were two witnesses who were involved in the Telub affair: the new chairman of the board, Olle Lund, who is also head of the mother firm Torerade Fabriksverken, and the secretary of the board, attorney Hans Ramshorn.

Olle Lund said, "Negotiations are still going on with the Libyan customer."

It is the military part of the training which will be terminated. Libya can therefore demand compensation.

Lund and Ramshorn did not desire to comment further.

Political Ramification Seen

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Apr 81 p 8

[Article by Sven Svensson: "Dealing With the Telub Affair. Censure of Three Cabinet Ministers Probable"]

[Text] The Riksdag is probably going to censure cabinet ministers Karin Soder (center), Eric Kronmark (conservative) and Staffan Burenstam Linder (conservative) for their handling of the Telub affair. The basis is that the ministers misled the Riksdag and the Swedish people.

As DAGENS NYHETER previously reported, the bourgeois majority on the committee did not criticize the bourgeois ministers who, on different occasions, dealt with the Telub affair. As happened last year, the majority believes that everything was done in a satisfactory manner.

On the other hand, the social democrats are going to censure ministers Karin Soder, Eric Kronmark, and Staffan Burenstam Linder. The opposition believes that the bourgeois government misled the Riksdag and the Swedish people in the Telub affair.

When the Riksdag votes in May, however, Olle Westberg (liberal) is expected to support the social democratic criticism of the bourgeois ministers. Westberg has consistently criticized the handling of the Telub affair.

Westberg will not disclose how he will vote, but he said that the Telub affair is an important moral and democratic matter. Opinions on this question should therefore outweigh party tactics and bourgeois loyalties.

The committee's report will be published on 8 May. Then the 17-18 interrogations which are the basis for the scrutiny of official responsibility will be released.

The most important interrogation will be that of former head of Telub, Bengt Omlund, and former Telub chairman, Eric Malmberg. In their interrogations it was disclosed that the management learned in May 1978 that the training of Libyans had a military aspect.

The point for the social democrats is that the ministries concerned had access to this information. The interrogations of Foreign Ministry officials Knut Thyberg and Carl Johan Groth are therefore considered interesting.

Karin Söder is criticized by the social democrats because she did not become sufficiently involved in the affair, Kronmark because he did not do enough to stop it, and Bureosson Linder because he gave misleading information to the Riksdag.

9/28/77

CRD: 1109/177

BRIEFS

FIRST ARMY COMMAND POSTS--The Sixth Military Region command in Metz has decided to renovate two of the 93 small forts of the Maginot Line in the eastern part of France: the Rochonvillers and Molvange fortifications, which are already undergoing renovation. In February, during the "Marceau" exercise of the First Army, whose command is located in Strasbourg, these two forts were used as maneuver CP [Command Posts]. The general staff has retained this arrangement and has decided to convert the two Rochonvillers and Molvange fortifications into permanent CP. Spokesmen at Sixth Military Region headquarters denied rumors that the two forts selected to serve as command posts for the First Army could be converted into experimental laboratories for testing gas warfare. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Apr 81 p 15] 11915

TACTICAL VEHICLE REPLACEMENTS--To replace various models of tactical vans used by ground forces (Dodge, Renault, Unimog), the Ministry of Defense has decided to use the TRM 2000, made by RVI. This van has a tiltable cab, a Renault 4-cylinder Turbo engine, transmission with five forward gears and two crossbars [ponts portiques]. The TRM 2000 will be used in a version for troop transport (12 men), combat unit support, mobile shelter, radio vehicle and repair vehicle. The army's equipment plan provides for the delivery of 12,000 vehicles, the first of which will be delivered beginning in 1983. [Text] [Paris DEFENSE INTERARMEES in French Apr 81 p 5] 11915

NEW COMMUNICATIONS REGIMENT--A new communications regiment [RT] is to be created sometime this year in the First Military Region: the 49th RT, an infrastructure regiment, which will include the resources of Regional Communications Operations Group No. 801 and the Marray RITTER [Ground Forces Infrastructure Communications Network] center, which is currently part of the Eighth RT. [Text] [Paris DEFENSE INTERARMEES in French Apr 81 p 5] 11915

CSO: 3100/685

CRIME STATISTICS GIVEN IN POLICE ACTIVITY REPORT

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 18 Apr 81 p 5

[Text] "Public order and security are, in general, at relatively satisfactory levels." This was maintained by Cities Police Chief K. Lemonis who was issuing for publicity the corps' activity report at a ceremony which took place at noon on 17 April at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry hall.

With the measures taken for more intensive policing, added Lemonis, and the effort being undertaken for broader cooperation of the police and public in taking measures for protection of the citizens' lives and property, it is reasonably expected that there will soon be very positive results.

The need for this cooperation between police and citizens was particularly noted in the brief speech of Minister of Public Order D. Davakis. There are, said Davakis, many signs of positive results from this cooperation. There is a need, he added, for the citizen, independent of party and political persuasions, to understand that the security corps are not simply his servants but also his protectors. Davakis also referred to the many unhealthy phenomena of international anarchy and terrorism and stressed that Greece, as was verified recently in the Council of Europe, is an example worthy of imitation in the sector of order and security. It is necessary, he ended, for all of us together to preserve these great goods.

The Numbers

Undertaking an analysis of the corps' accomplishments, Police Chief Lemonis noted, among other things, that:

1. Informing of the police by citizens about illegal activity of our fellow-men is anything but "spying" and consequently is not a reprehensible act.
2. The police's precautionary work occurs quietly and efficiently so that there is a high feeling of security among citizens. Equally important, he said, is the police's repressive activity.
3. The infractions which occupied the police in 1980, in its sector of responsibility, were 370 felonies, versus 329 in 1979, 50,394 misdemeanors, versus 53,695 in 1979 and 404,664 minor infractions versus 522,035 in 1979. That is, there is a significant increase in the number of felonies (the largest in the past five years) which is due to the increase in thefts, frauds, homicides, rapes and narcotics (114

in 1980 versus 170). (Editors note: Lemonis is referring surely to the cases of narcotics use and trafficking which reached the police's knowledge, not the thousands of others which escaped the comprehension and "grip" of security authorities.) A decrease was observed in hold-ups (29 in 1980, versus 39 in 1979), debauchments and forgeries.

4. A decrease is also observed in violations of the marketing code, labor laws, and traffic code, homicides due to negligence, bodily injuries, abuses and destruction of foreign property, while more violations of the sanitation ordinances, building regulations, energy saving, threat and thefts in general were confirmed.

5. Criminality in general presented the usual year to year fluctuation with the exception of offenses against property generally and in particular burglaries which show a continual upward trend.

6. Violations related to narcotics do not cause anxiety; the quantitative increase is small. (Editor's note: We repeat that Lemonis is referring only to investigated cases.)

At any rate, the danger of narcotics dissemination, especially among young people, is being confronted with particular attention by the police. Lemonis stressed the need for extensive education of the public about narcotics.

7. The police's efforts to discover the perpetrators of the murder of the two policemen (Petrou and Stamoulis), the arsons of the two shopping centers and certain robberies have not yet been successful.

Lemonis also referred to the corps' weaknesses in the sector of policing which he attributed to the policemen's work load and to the low standing of the meaning of respect and obedience to the laws which is observed in many cases.

Ending, he noted that "up to now, when we spoke about criminality, we meant the traditional kind, whereas now the new form of criminality does not move within these frameworks and crime has been turned to self-aim, without logical motives.

This last verification of Lemonis, which undoubtedly is a result of experience and specific numerical and statistical data, is surely the most alarming element. It is this which must concern both the police and central civil authority, but also the citizens.

Present at yesterday's ceremony were: Minister of Justice G. Stamatis; Deputy Minister of Social Services G. Apostolatos; the general secretaries of the ministries of public order and interior, K. Sapsalis and A. Botsis; deputies; administrators of banks, organizations and firms; Gendarmery Chief M. Argiannis; former chiefs of the police corps and other officials.

9247

CSO: 4908 /148

NEW LEGISLATION FOR HANDICAPPED ENACTED

Athens: THE ATHENIAN in English May 1981 pp 15-17

[Text]

1. *more systematic approach to problems of the disabled*
2. *Greece is promised by recent legislation*

ALTHOUGH there is no systematically attained figure for Greece, UN statistics, based on countries where more precise analyses have been carried out, suggest that as much as 10% of the Greek population is mentally or physically disabled. And in Greece, as in most countries, the degree of impairment may be dramatically enhanced by what one social worker here calls the "disabling attitude of society". An impairment becomes truly "disabling" when society does not make adequate allowances for it by normalizing the life of a handicapped person either through special education, vocational training, or adaptation of the physical environment to his needs.

The prospects for disabled children in Greece were considerably improved by the passage in late March of a wide-ranging law for their education, vocational training, rehabilitation and community care. It precedes in spirit, although not chronologically, an equally significant measure passed in 1979, providing for the vocational training and rehabilitation of the adult handicapped. Both the 1979 law and that passed on March 31 outline in detail a sys-

tematic approach to the problems of the handicapped, with the aim of integrating them as far as possible into the social and economic mainstream of Greek life.

The present law has been in the making since 1975, years which saw the mushrooming of schools for the disabled, above all in the private sector. Up to now, assistance to the disabled has been hampered by a lack of organization and coordination among the various services available. There are a number of government-established special schools under a director of special education in the Ministry of Education. At the same time, certain services — such as the Institute of the Deaf — fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social Welfare. Others are under the Ministry of Health. With the new law, all of these services will be brought under the aegis of the Ministry of Education.

To date, the pressure on government services or government-subsidized services has been tremendous. It is estimated by one official in the Ministry of Education that of approximately 150,000 children in need of special education and train-

ing, only 4,000 are actually being aided by either government-supported or private institutions. Most of the specialized services at present are located in Athens. In general, if parents suspect that their child is disabled in some way, they can have him diagnosed at one of the multi-diagnostic centers. Ideally, the child's impairment and degree of impairment are identified and the appropriate schooling and treatment recommended. But in the case of very young children, pre-school educational centers are only now being developed. Otherwise, the family has to wait until the child is seven, and by then, in the words of one educator, "it's too late": a child's single disability - as for example deafness - may have been translated into multiple disabilities because of his emotional or physical stunting.

Furthermore, establishing exactly what is appropriate treatment for each child is complicated by the general lack, hitherto, of specialized schools and specialized personnel. There has been an attempt to fill the gap in public services by the private sector, with mixed results. A number of the most successful and progressive institutions are privately-sponsored. A case in point is the Spastics Society, founded by the parent of a handicapped child in 1972. Since then, the Society has established training centers, offers assistance in finding employment, and gives financial and moral support for spastics and for their families. It has also been extremely successful in mobilizing public support through various fund-raising activities, and, to a certain extent, in educating public opinion about this handicap.

While an organization such as the Spastics Society is an example of the best in private initiative, there are a number of privately run institutions which have been in need of stronger government control. Previous to the new law, the criteria for

these schools were not firmly established (although all were subject to official checks) resulting in some cases in exploitation of the fears and desperation of parents. Such schools can charge around 10,000 drachmas per month for their services. If recognized by the state, social security pays 7-8000 of this, the parents 2000 or so. As one special educator points out, the fee is "not a lot of money if you're doing the job right, but a lot if you're not".

The lack of public education and parental counselling or support has in many cases created its own set of severe problems. The attitude of a parent can range from despair to shame, to fear, to anger when confronted with the multiple problems presented by a disabled child. It takes a great deal of work, both from within and without, for the parent to develop a more positive attitude towards his child's affliction, and to believe that his child is not necessarily doomed to a life of dependency, isolation and exclusion. At one level, there are those whose reactions of shame and guilt leads them to hide or isolate the child. Then there are those who from desperation, ignorance, or lack of trust spend their time and money trekking from one doctor to another, and even from one country to another, hoping for a miracle or at least a diagnosis which they can put their faith in. Furthermore, once a decision has been made as to the appropriate education and treatment, it means a continuing effort on behalf of the parents to supplement the treatment in their own attitude and support of the child. As Alex Liambey, who founded a family-based pre-school for deaf infants some three years ago, points out, it is tremendously difficult and critically important to educate the parents: "The school's efforts can only reach the child so far; after that, it is up to the parents."

But not only parents are in need of education. There is also a need

for teaching the teachers of the handicapped. At present, there is an In-service Training Program at the Marasleion School for educating teachers to work with the mentally handicapped. But there is no equivalent for imparting the highly specific skills of teaching the deaf or blind, or those with learning disabilities, or other impairments. People who plan to work in government-sponsored schools learn by observation. They sit in on classes at the various institutions, and at the end of a given period they receive a teaching certificate. This kind of education-by-observation results in, as one educator puts it, a "teachable lack of theory". A number of people take it on themselves to reinforce the theoretical and practical side of their studies by going abroad to work and study, but obviously this solution is not open to all.

If Greece is to follow successfully the practice of mainstreaming the less severely handicapped by placing them in normal classrooms, then even the ordinary classroom teacher needs re-education. In this case, it is sometimes a question also of re-educating attitudes, so that teacher and fellow pupils alike focus on what the handicapped child can do, not what it can't. At present, there is little room within the Greek classroom for any deviation from the average, so that children who cannot follow the lessons within the traditionally-established norm, for whatever reason, are often excluded from the learning process. At the same time, as one teacher pointed out, there are often cases in villages of unintentional mainstreaming, whereby a mildly handicapped child may be placed because of a lack of alternative facilities in public school and educated along with the rest of his peer group. For the child's complete integration, however, his teachers and fellow pupils must become fully conscious of his possibilities, not his disabilities.

The new law, which most observers consider both extremely comprehensive and progressive, has taken into account these many problems in its attempt to establish a firm basis for further action. It is, in the words of one education ministry official, a "framework on which we will build," with subsequent government decrees where further development is necessary. In its general definition of disabled children, the wording of the law was carefully selected to give the broadest latitude possible, and although it lists categories of impairments, it also extends aid to all those who exhibit any impairment which might restrict them from following a normal course of education and eventually attaining employment and the possibility of independence. As with a law passed in the United States in the early 1970s, providing for rights of the handicapped, the Greek measure aims at "appropriate education in the least restrictive environment". Wherever possible, it prefers that the handicapped be integrated into the mainstream, starting in early childhood with attendance at regular schools, or special classes within schools for the lightly handicapped.

Also according to the new law, the government will expand its diagnostic services. Besides the present centers, the use of school psychological centers is to be developed, while for outlying areas the law prescribes mobile units which are to include a doctor, psychologist, social worker, and special educator. The pressing need for specialized personnel is covered by provisions for special classes at already established institutions; furthermore, people will be encouraged to go abroad if need be for further training and experience. The staffs of already existing schools, private or public, must meet certain specified qualifications within a given period after the passage of the law.

Although the new measures have met with enthusiasm among most people involved in special education,

some have adopted a wait-and-see attitude. They cite the time, effort and funds needed to effect the changes, and as one social worker notes, both private and public services for the handicapped have to overcome, even with the new law, certain problems of organization, coordination and inter-service competition which blocks cooperation. Commenting on the law, educators Nick Mantarakis of Psychico College and Jane Thomas of American Community Schools, who are preparing a status paper on the handicapped child in Greece, point out that "everything is covered", but it will take time and public support to build up a network of schools and teachers as well as public and parental support and understanding.

Public education is one of the main aims of the International Year of Disabled Persons, declared by the UN for 1980-81. Its principle theme and main aim is "full participation for disabled people" in their various societies. Within Greece, a National Committee for the IYDP, under the auspices of the Ministry of Social Services, established local guidelines for the Year. Besides an Executive Committee, headed by the director of the National Rehabilitation Service, sixteen sub-committees were created to deal with specific problems of handicapped people in Greece. Of the approximately 160 members, a third are disabled themselves or parents of disabled children. The committees are approaching the problems of the handicapped from various standpoints: social as well as technical problems of rehabilitation, special education and vocational

training, education of professional and volunteer personnel, possible adaptations to the physical environment for the handicapped person, and examination of prevention of certain kinds of disabilities in relation to diet and disease. One of the committees has been assigned to collect and classify the disparate services available to the handicapped in Greece, both government and private. Finally, there are several committees involved in the basic task of educating the public and publicizing the scope and eventually the results of the IYDP efforts as well as the situation of the disabled in general.

Out of the recommendations of these subcommittees a number will be selected by the Executive Committee for promotion, and if possible, implementation. Many of the subjects they cover have already been dealt with, in spirit at least, by the laws of 1979 and 1981; their recommendations could provide suggestions for more effective realization of the laws. But it may be the publicity around these UN-declared "Years" which will prove to be the most significant contribution to the situation of the handicapped in Greece. One ministry official who saw the Year of the Child (1979) "come and go, without any significant effects here", professes himself cynical about the substantive successes of an IYDP - but he acknowledges that perhaps a generally unaware public will become sensitized to the problems involved and more supportive both of those afflicted and of programs to aid them.

-C.V.

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